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Abstract
Supply chain workers make observable, preventable errors while completing their
assigned tasks in the shipping process. Previous research has indicated that individuals
with a greater grasp of their work and better system-knowledge are less likely to commit
interpretation errors. A worker’s task performance and contextual performance may,
likewise, be affected by an individual’s knowledge of why and where they fit into a larger
system—defined as mission clarity. Mission clarity is comprised of education,
experience and subject characteristics. This research conducts a controlled experiment
with 100 workers in the Air Force supply career field assessing the relationships of
mission clarity elements and job performance. The results show that mission clarity
affects pick and pack job performance in controlled warehouse order fulfillment tasks.
Results also reveal that participants who received the experience portion of mission
clarity committed fewer errors, resulting in increased task performance.
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I. Introduction
Problem Context
Human errors, inventory record inaccuracies, and organizational learning can cause
and result from shipping errors (Argote, 2013; DeHoratius and Raman, 2008; Embrey
and Lane, 1990). As an example, consider an incident from 2005-2008 that occurred
involving Minuteman III nuclear missile components. In March of 2005 missile nose
cones with fuses, but no nuclear material, were sent from F.E. Warren Air Force Base
(AFB) to Hill AFB for storage. The items were mislabeled on the outside of the box as
helicopter batteries and were placed on a pallet with other helicopter batteries. In August
of 2006, Taiwan ordered helicopter batteries and the order was fulfilled from the Hill
AFB storage facility. In March of 2008, Taiwan service members attempted to install the
batteries and noticed they were the wrong part. They started the process for
reimbursement and U.S. authorities realized the mistake and recovered the parts. The box
was closed in March of 2005 and not opened until August 2008; all this time it was
mislabeled and improperly accounted for and stored incorrectly (White, 2008).
The incident led to a public relations firestorm. There were 15 senior officers
disciplined, extended media coverage and assessments throughout the Department of
Defense (DOD). This inventory record inaccuracy, coupled with human error led to a
significant shipping error. Afterwards, numerous root-cause studies were conducted and
organizational changes were implemented, including standing up a new operational
command structure called “Global Strike Command.” The goal of the changes and new
command was to affect organizational change, facilitate learning and develop a culture of
safety (Amaani, 2009). This example shows the interplay of human errors, the
1

importance of record accuracy, and the impact organization learning (or the lack there of)
can have on shipping performance.
Errors in supply chain management can also be abundant and costly. In 2010, about
750,000 warehouses worldwide distributed approximately 1 trillion US dollars in goods.
Warehouses represent approximately 20% of the logistics costs for many businesses, and
order picking accounts for 55% to 65% of the total operational costs of a warehouse (De
Koster et al., 2007). The large cost associated with warehouse operations generates the
need for efficient and effective operations. The operations within a warehouse can be
decomposed into individual tasks. Each task is affected by a number of known and
unknown influences. Managers seek out practical methods to improve task performance,
thereby increasing warehouse, firm and supply chain performance.
There are many processes in a warehouse, see Figure 1. However, they can be
crudely categorized into four basic areas: 1) to receive the goods from a source, 2) to
store the goods until they are required, 3) to pick the goods when they are required, and
4) to ship the goods to the appropriate user. Of these four areas, order picking is the most
fertile process for productivity improvements since it is the most labor-intensive
operation in warehouses with manual systems, and a very capital-intensive operation in
warehouses with automated systems (Li et al., 2012). Being labor-intensive and the most
expensive warehouse activity, errors in order picking can lead to increased inventory
record inaccuracies (IRI) (Thiel et al., 2010) and higher costs for the entire supply chain
(De Koster et al., 2007).

2

Figure 1: Typical Warehouse Functions and Flows (Tompkins, 2003)

Order picking is the term for all the sub-tasks required to gather items from an
assorted inventory in preparation for shipment or internal movement; it is a fundamental
activity performed in warehouses (Baumann et al., 2012). Often, the items are located in
bins placed on shelves or large racking. Accompanying the task of order picking is the
process of packing the picked items in preparation for shipment to the customer. In some
warehouses, individuals are now capable of attaining 1000 picks per hour (De Koster et
al., 2007). Such a vast number of actions creates significant potential for errors. Errors
in the shipping process come from a variety of sources such as picking the wrong item,
wrong amount, breakage, and confusion (De Koster et al., 2007). Another common
source of errors arises from the necessity for workers to enter data into an information
system. These errors frequently generate inaccurate inventory records that can propagate
3

to picking errors, resulting in increased order-return costs, create negative publicity, and
can even pose safety hazards, such as when critical items do not arrive when and where
needed (d’Hont, 2004).
Research into human task provides the most insight when the task elements are
understood and assess individually (Swain, 1990). Early task analysis efforts by Taylor
(1911) and Gilbreth (1909) showed that a higher-level task could be broken down into its
constituent parts (Diaper and Stanton, 2003). The process to assign each action a unique
probability of error originated in 1952 with mathematician Herman Williams and
electronics engineer Purdy Meigs at Sandia National Laboratories (Swain, 1990), who
wanted to find ways to reduce the risk associated with working on nuclear weapons. The
work of these early researchers has evolved into the field of human reliability analysis
(HRA) (Swain, 1990). A key element of HRA is that each task performed by workers
can be analyzed and assigned a probability of error based upon how often workers fail to
complete the task in an acceptable manner. Furthermore, if a desired final error-rate is
desired, managers can look at sub-tasks to find where improvements will have the most
impact on overall performance (Bedny and Karwowski, 2003).
In supply chain management, human errors have been addressed peripherally; an
exception is found in the Toyota Production System (TPS) and Lean initiatives, which
have emphasized the impact of individual performance on overall production systems
(Swamidass, 2007). TPS implements kanban structures, which are visual motivational
elements to enhance performance. The kanban process makes a previously arbitrary
action visible and is a constant reminder of the task at hand (Takahashi et al., 2007).
Beyond TPS and Lean process movements, other aspects of the supply chain can be
4

affected by human errors (Galar et al., 2011). Supply chain management (SCM)
literature has called for more studies assessing how individuals affect supply chain
performance (Ballard, 1996; Fawcett et al., 2010).
This research addresses the phenomenon of human-errors in the supply chain in light
of what has been called the Medici Effect, popularized in Frans Johansson’s book “The
Medici Effect” (Johansson, 2006). The Medici Effect states that discoveries often happen
at the intersection of disciplines. Similarly, this research integrates key elements from
human factors research, inventory management, and behavioral operations into the supply
chain management (SCM) setting. Each of these disciplines contributes to understanding
the phenomenon leading to errors in pick and pack operations. First, human factors
research has looked at human performance in a variety of settings (Reason, 1995).
Secondly, inventory management research has discovered that worker errors both
contribute to and are caused by inventory record inaccuracies (IRI) (Mersereau, 2013).
Thirdly, behavioral operations has shown how improvements in performance are related
to individual traits including learning, both individually and how the organization learns
processes and maintains cooperate knowledge (Argote, 2013; Bendoly et al., 2010).
Lastly, the individual differences have been shown to impact behaviors (Jawahar and
Gerald, 2011). Therefore, the current state of academic research is primed for an analysis
of how individual performance affects warehouse operations, specifically picking
operations. This research seeks to fill the SCM human-error gap by integrating these
major areas into a model of individual job performance and conducting a controlled
experiment to test the proposed model.

5

II. Literature Review
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
‐‐T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets

Introduction
The above quote provides a poetic description of how academia and industry have
viewed the relationship of training workers and performance. We know that without
training, performance decreases and conversely, with more training performance
increases (Fry, 1992). However, we do not often know precisely what training is most
effective. How much training is enough? What amount of training provides the best
return on investment? What is the most influential part of training: task training,
education, or experience? How do we know the workers are actually learning what they
are being taught? This research begins with these questions in light of the basic model
below presented by Bruccoleri et al. (2014, p. 802).

Worker
Behavior

Firm
Performance

Figure 2: Worker Performance Model (Bruccoleri et al., 2014)

However, there are other factors influencing the basic relationship depicted in Figure
2. One example is that contextual performance affects job performance (Conway, 1999).
This research will present results from literature to expand the conceptual model above,
Figure 2, to include two additional steps, depicted in Figure 3.
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Worker
Errors

Firm
Performance

Job
Performance

Supply Chain
Performance

Figure 3: Errors and SCM Performance Model

This research discusses theories that help to establish a logical flow of how human
error affects the SC and how organizations can and should address human error. This
research begins by looking at the individual’s performance in relation to learning,
education, experience and training. Next, the research considers literature showing how
organizations learn and how both individual and organizational learning affect
performance. Performance is considered at the individual and organizational levels; this
research also connects the resource-based view (RBV) and knowledge-based view (KBV)
theories of the firm to firm performance. Errors are an inherent component of
performance (Knoll, 2012); therefore this research will also present error theories,
mitigation strategies and consequences. However, to begin this research will look at
learning; first as individual, then, as an organization.
Individual Learning and Education
Learning is not a modern field of study; it has well established origins from the
ancient philosophers (Jaeger, 1934) to more modern influential scholars such as John
Dewey to contemporary scholars (Merriam et al., 2007). This research presents some of
the overarching theories that researchers have broadly accepted and related to
measureable behavioral outcomes. The behavioral outcomes include worker performance
(Schunk, 2011) .
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Behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism, and transformative learning are the general
learning theories most often referenced when discussing instructional settings (Siemens,
2005). Within these theories, the researchers present nuanced definitions of learning.
Still, many of the definitions are quite similar; below, this research presents three
definitions and discusses their common elements. First, consider Driscoll (2000), who
defines learning as “a persisting change in human performance or performance
potential…[which] must come about as a result of the learner’s experience and
interaction with the world” (Driscoll, 2000, p. 11). A second, and widely used definition
of learning is, “a relatively permanent change in behavioral potentiality that occurs as a
result of reinforced practice” (Kimble, 1961, p. 6). Finally, an updated definition based
on Kimble’s definition that incorporates changes in the field of learning is Olson’s (2015)
definition. “Learning is a relatively permanent change in behavior or in behavioral
potentiality that results from experience and cannot be attributed to temporary body states
such as those induced by illness, fatigue, or drugs” (Olson, 2015, p. 6).
The above definitions all share the view that learning is relatively permanent.
Furthermore, learning involves both the learner and some outside event, either
experience, practice, or interaction with the world. The definitions also require
behavioral change from the learner. Not all researchers studying learning agree that a
behavioral change is necessary. Gestalt learning falls under the cognitive perspective of
learning (Rock and Palmer, 1990). According to Gestalt theory, an initial failure, called
impasse, is necessary for insight learning. An impasse requires the learners to forego
their first solution strategy and begin the cognitive trial-and-error processes. As they
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struggle through the cognitive trial-and-error process, they restructure or re-organize
prior knowledge into new information, learning (Ash et al., 2012, p. 8).
Learning cannot be directly studied (Olson, 2015); therefore, researchers must utilize
some observable element to act a surrogate for learning. So, even when researchers use a
definition such as “learning refers to a change in behavior potentiality and performance
refers to the translation of this potentiality” (Olson, 2015, p. 4), they still must develop a
means to measure that potentiality. The behavioral element is a requirement for
observation and measurement. Although, it is not a requirement for theory development
nor introspective assessments (Ash et al., 2012). Indeed, many models of learning and
cognition accept insight and knowledge before any behavioral change is exhibited
(Köhler, 1959). Köhler elaborates by defining insight as, “the fact that, when we are
aware of a relation, of any relation, this relation is not experienced as a fact by itself, but
rather as something that follows from the characteristics of the objects under
consideration” (1959, p. 729). Constructivism also includes insight as a vital element,
but emphasizes the active involvement of the learner (Merriam et al., 2007). Finally,
transformative learning theory includes three primary avenues of expanding
consciousness: psychological, convictional, and behavioral (Mezirow, 1991). Again, we
see the common elements of internal change occurring with learning, but still
acknowledging that some behavioral resultant change is possible, if not apparent;
therefore we would expect an experimental design looking at behavioral change to
consider learning as a variable. Next, this research will cover literature that looks at the
other aspect inherent to learning: education.

9

Education and Experience
The purpose of education according to Dewey was “to prepare the young for future
responsibilities and for success in life, by means of acquisition of the organized bodies of
information and prepared forms of skill which comprehend the material of instruction”
(Dewey, 1938, p. 3). He viewed learners as passive recipients of their education; he did
not mean it derogatory but to say that they lack the life experiences necessary to connect
experience and education. He proposes an alternative method to standardized lectures of
abstract thoughts that emphasizes linking experiences to the subject matter (Dewey,
1938). Dewey further suggests that progressive education will move from accepting
passive learners to helping students understand the intimate and necessary relationship
between education and experience. He contends that for learning to take place, it
depends on the learner having the correct idea of related experiences. However, he warns
against equating experience with education. In fact, an experience can be counterproductive towards learning and education. He recommends providing experiences that
enable and enhance education (Dewey, 1938). Kolb expanded Dewey’s work by defining
learning as, “the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of
experience.” (Kolb, 1984). This definition deviates from the definitions presented earlier;
it does not include a behavioral requirement and elevates the importance of experience.
This view of education and experience is consistent with Kolb and Kolb’s experiencebased learning theory (Kolb and Kolb, 2005). Experience-based learning theory is an
extension of Dewey’s perspective that education should include experience in addition to
traditional educational methods (Dewey, 1938).
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Skinner isolated the experience concept, contending that learning occurs as the result
of a repeated and reinforced stimulus (Skinner, 1953). His work has evolved into the
classical behaviorism with wide-spread acceptance of the stimulus-response (S-R)
phenomenon (Chance, 2007). Researchers have expanded, even replaced, Skinners S-R
model (Chance, 2007; Moxley, 1998). However, the role experiences play in learning
has not faded (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). The goal of education in industry is to
enable to the worker to accomplish some new task or to accomplish an activity with
better performance (Crick et al., 2013). In the military, the services send workers to
technical schools ranging from a few weeks to many months based on the complexity to
the career field (USAF, 2014). The goal is that the workers are able to perform the tasks
for which they were trained (USAF, 2008). Therefore, managers (and academics) must
assess the performance of the workers to see what was learned and how it will impact
organizational performance.
Performance
Increased performance is the desired result of learning and, by extension, the goal of
training, education and experience (Crick et al., 2013). Motowildo et al., build the case
that job performance is comprised of task and contextual performance; they define job
performance as the “aggregated value to the organization of the discrete behavioral
episodes that an individual performs over a standard interval of time” (1997, p. 72).
Furthermore, their theory integrates individual personality and cognitive differences to
explain the variability in task and contextual performance. Motowidlo and Van Scotter
conducted job performance research in an operational setting using real-world tasks and
surveys. They utilized 715 Air Force mechanics ranging from the enlisted ranks of E-2 to
11

E-5. The subjects were graded by senior supervisors on overall performance, task
performance and contextual performance. They found that experience explains more
variance in task performance and personality explains more variance in contextual
performance (Motowidlo and Van Scotter, 1994). This research will look at both task
performance and contextual performance in more depth below.
Task Performance
“Behavior is what people do at work. Performance is behavior with an evaluative
component” (Motowidlo et al., 1997, p. 73). The workers’ performance will change the
condition of the organization and will either contribute to or hinder organizational goals
(Motowidlo and Van Scotter, 1994). Motowidlo makes a distinction of task performance
that is intuitive, but the distinction has not garnered wide acceptance (Yang et al., 2016).
Motowidlo describes the first type of task performance as “activities that transform raw
materials into the goods and services that are the organization’s products” (Motowidlo et
al., 1997, p. 75). He defines type two as the support, administrative and logistical tasks
(Motowidlo et al., 1997). Although his terminology and stark delineation has not gained
wide usage, academics and practitioners continue to acknowledge a difference in sharpend and blunt-end positions in an organization (Dekker et al., 2011; Hopkins, 2012;
Reason, 2002). This difference may play a role in how well the workers perceive the
impact of their daily routines. It may be that type one task, sharp-end, have a more
accurate perspective of how their actions accomplish the organizations goals (Reason,
1998). If so, the type two tasks, support or blunt-end, may not have as broad a
perspective of how their actions affect the primary mission of the organization. Both
classes of behaviors bear a direct relation to the organization’s technical core either by
12

direct execution, sharp-end, or by maintenance and support, blunt-end (Motowidlo and
Van Scotter, 1994; Reason, 2008).
So, how can organizations improve worker performance? Brackenreg has found that
experiential learning can improve task performance (2004). She defines experiential
learning as including some sort of doing along with traditional education. This method of
teaching is focused on gaining a better understanding of the task itself. The goal is help
the worker to attain a better cognitive understanding of the task to the point they are able
to articulate what they are doing, connecting their experience to the principle being taught
(Brackenreg, 2004). Kolb (2009; 1984) developed a conceptual model, see Figure 4,
showing how the cyclical nature of experiential learning can lead to broader, and
hopefully more accurate, formation of abstract concepts. Therefore, research assessing
performance would expect experiences to affect the measured outcomes.

Figure 4: Lewinian Experiential Learning Model (Kolb, 1984)
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In the field of human factors, researchers have been concerned with performance
since its inception (Reason, 1990). Rasmussen developed a widely accepted three-level
framework for understanding human performance, see Figure 5 (Rasmussen, 1983;
Sheridan, 2015). “SRK provides a language in which to talk about types of behavior as a
basis for system design. It provides a basis on which to clarify differences in behavior.”
(Goodstein et al., 1988, p. 28).
Rasmussen’s early discussions of SRK began with skills, then rules and showed
knowledge as the most advanced; later models by Rasmussen and other researchers
reverse the order to show the natural progress experienced in learning (Sheridan, 2015).
Knowledge-based behaviors occur in situations that are somewhat unfamiliar;
considerable cognition is required to interpret, diagnose and decide upon an action
(Rasmussen, 1982). Rule-based behaviors require more cognitive effort than skill-based
behaviors, however they are based on previously experienced and stored (cognitively or
externally) rules (Rasmussen, 1982). “The activity at the rule-based level is to coordinate
and control a sequence of skilled acts, the size and complexity of which depend on the
level of skill in a particular situation—one single decision to go home for dinner may be
enough for driving you there, if the ride is not disturbed” (Rasmussen and Lind, 1982, p.
10). Skill-based behavior consists of stored patterns of behavior such as driving a
vehicle, operating familiar machinery or performing routine tasks (Goodstein et al.,
1988). Rasmussen emphasizes that the line between skill-based and rule-based behaviors
can be fuzzy and depends on the experience of the individual (Rasmussen and Lind,
1982). As workers face new indicators (stimuli) they can switch between the levels of
performance. Thus, when people face a new stimuli they are forced out of skill-based
14

routine and perform a quick search for a stored rule. If a rule-based behavior is
appropriate, the worker will execute it. However, if the worker is not able to retrieve a
stored rule, they will resort to knowledge-based processing (Goodstein et al., 1988).
Actions at the knowledge-based level are much slower, require more cognitive resources
and lead to more varied errors (Reason, 1990).

SKILL-BASED
BEHAVIOR

Figure 5: SRK Performance Levels (Rasmussen, 1983)

Many researchers have built upon Rasmussen’s work; one common extension is
Reason Generic Error Model (GEM) (Reason, 1990; Sheridan, 2015). Reason’s proposed
three types of errors: slips, lapses and mistakes (Reason, 1990). Reason says that the
GEM relates to Rasmussen’s SRK framework; “in particular it illuminates the origins of
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both the commonplace departures of action from intention slips and lapses and far more
subtle reasons why plans sometimes fail to achieve the desired end (mistakes)” (Reason,
1990, p. 35). Reason explains that the reason the SRK model has persisted overtime is
that it intuitively matches our behavior. He states that humans are compulsive patternmatchers (Reason, 2002). When confronted with novel challenges, our automatic
reaction is to seek some off-the-shelf solution from within our stock of stored routines.
Such choices are guided by two simple heuristics: (1) match like with like and (2) where
there is a set of equally desirable possibilities, apply the one most used. (Goodstein et al.,
1988). This research will look the GEM in more depth later in the context of human error
theories. Now, the research will turn from task performance to present the other aspect of
job performance, contextual performance.
Contextual Performance
Motowidlo et al. define contextual performance as:
“activities that promote the viability of the social and organizational
network and enhance the psychological climate in which the technical core
is embedded, activity such as helping in cooperating with others;
following organizational rules and procedures even when personally
inconvenient; endorsing, supporting, and defending organizational
objectives; persisting with extra enthusiasm when necessary to complete
successfully; in volunteering to carry on task activities that are not
formally part of the job” (1997, p. 76).
Researchers have used the term contextual performance to refer to the phenomenon
above; however, many researchers use the term organizational citizenship behavior
(OCB) to describe similar behaviors. Organ’s original definition was:
“individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly
recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate
promotes the effective functioning of the organization. By discretionary,
we mean that the behavior is not an enforceable requirement of the role or
the job description, that is, the clearly specifiable terms of the person’s
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employment contract with the organization; the behavior is rather a matter
of personal choice, such that its omission is not generally understood as
punishable” (Organ, 1988, p. 4)
Organ now defines OCB as, “performance that supports the social and psychological
environment in which task performance tasks place” (Organ, 1997, p. 95). The new OCB
definition is more succinct; Organ even says the contextual performance and OCB are
now considered synonymous. He states that the only remaining difference is that he
considers OCB to be exclusive to non-rewarded task (and non-punishable for neglecting
the task) whereas contextual performance might include all non-technical related tasks
(Organ, 1997). In addition to being a construct, OCB is also a well-used survey measure
designed to capture contextual performance (Smith et al., 1983). Therefore, for the
remainder of this research, the terms are considered synonymous and the term OCB will
be used to refer to the measure of contextual performance.
This researcher has presented literature that shows the dual nature of job
performance, task performance and contextual performance. Before leaving the topic,
this research will consider one other relevant view regarding the determinants of job
performance. Motowidlo (1997) expands the work of Hunter (1983) in defining three
distinct determinants of job performance: declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge
and skill, and motivation. Declarative knowledge is the knowledge of facts principles
and procedures; procedure knowledge is both skill and actually doing what should be
done; motivation is a choice comprised of, whether to exert effort, how much effort to
exert, and how long to exert effort. Motowidlo found that, “individual differences in
personality, ability, and interests are presumed to combine and interact with education,
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training, and experience to shape declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge and
skill” (Motowidlo et al., 1997, p. 77).
Theories of the Firm
In this section, this research compares two theories of the firm. This research
considers the resource-based view (RBV) and the knowledge-based view (KBV) theories
of the firm due to their interconnectedness of ideas with performance, human factors and
organizational learning. The prevalent theories that researchers use in the SCM field
often only address human errors only peripherally, if at all (Williams and Tokar, 2008).
These two theories integrate the human component to varying degrees and will be useful
for applying our research to the SCM field.
Most academics contend Wernerfelt (1984) formalized the RBV theory, although
some cite Penrose (1959) as the progenitor of RBV (Conner, 1991). Wernerfelt (1984)
proposed that firms should consider the resource side of their operations to the extent that
most firms analyze the production side. He does not use the terms upstream and
downstream resources, but that is how some have described RBV more recently
(Rungtusanatham et al., 2003; Zhu et al., 2004). He defined firm resources as “assets
which are tied semi-permanently to the firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 172). He offers an
even broader definition by saying resources can be viewed as the strength or weakness of
a firm: such as, brand names, in-house knowledge, employee skills, contacts, equipment,
and procedures. The RBV looks at both tangible and intangible assets. Therefore, it has
been used in a broad spectrum of applications (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010).
Some have argued that RBV is not a true theory of the firm (Foss, 1996). The widely
accepted standard for a theory of the firm is that it must answer two questions: first, why
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does the firm exists, and what is the firm’s scope (Coase and Coase, 1937; Conner, 1991;
Demsetz, 1988)? The argument against RBV as a theory of the firm contends that it
explains how a firm operates and competes (scope), but it does not explain why the firm
exists. Without addressing the firm’s purpose for being, some cannot accept it as a valid
theory of the firm (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010). Nonetheless, there are many who consider
it to be an adequate theory of the firm (Barney, 1994; Conner, 1991; Foss, 1996).
Another perspective is to pair the RBV with the KBV to create a viable theory of the firm
(Dosi et al., 2008; Grant, 1996).
As with all theories, they are refined and advanced by others, even morphing
significantly over time. RBV is no exception. The following quote is from Wernerfelt
written as ten-year follow-up to his original article. “The original paper is very terse and
abstract, hiding both the practicality and the generality of the ideas. In my view, the
paper was not influential because of my own later work, but because a number of others
chose to build on it” (Wernerfelt, 1995, p. 171). A good example of how it has evolved is
found in Barney’s (1994) explanation of a firm's sustained competitive advantage (SCA).
If a firm desires to obtain a SCA it needs to procure and fully exploit valuable, rare,
inimitable, and non-substitutable resources. As firms compete, under the RBV, the firm
that has the best resources and can fully exploit them will outperform other firms.
Therefore, the firms should develop the resources that give them the best advantage
(Wernerfelt, 1984). A workers’ effectiveness is considered a resource (Peteraf, 1993);
the more effective workforce will commit fewer errors (Reason, 2000). Consequently,
the firm with the more effective workforce will have a more valuable human capital
resource, which is a factor in their SCA.
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The KBV faces many of the same criticisms and hurdles as the RBV; however, when
they are viewed in tandem, more researchers are willing to accept them as a theory of the
firm (Foss, 1996; Takeuchi’, 2013). The RBV includes knowledge as a resource;
however, KBV elevates knowledge above other sources. Researchers give knowledge
preeminence over other resources due to its difficulty to develop, synergistic effects, and
strategic importance (Purser and Montuori, 1995). Knowledge is also unique when firms
seek to procure it as a resource. Spender (1996) shows that knowledge procurement is
inherently different from other resources. Spender’s arguments are similar to the concept
presented below, see Figure 6, showing that knowledge can reside in an organization
even if all the people in the organization are exchanged. The RBV originated out of
economic literature as an alternative to transaction based economics (Penrose, 1959;
Wernerfelt, 1984). Whereas, the KBV originated from strategic management efforts
(Phelan and Lewin, 2000); the literature supporting a KBV of the firm has a stronger
psychology and management background (Huber, 1991). The KBV, as a theory of the
firm, requires the foundational theory of organizational learning.
Organizational Learning
Organizational learning (OL) has been defined as a construct, field, and theory. OL,
has changed significantly in the literature in recent decades. Therefore, this research uses
the historical evolutionary perspective (Shah and Ward, 2007) to first look at the past
development of OL and its early use in the social sciences, progressing to how supply
chain (SC) managers presently view it. Next, the research will present recommendations
from literature for better use of OL, and show how OL relates to other valuable theories
employed in SCM.
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OL is a competence that all organizations should actively develop, given that it has
been shown that the better organizations learn, the more likely they are to detect errors,
correct them, innovate and even assess what errors they cannot detect (Argyris, 1999).
Research involving OL has evolved through many definitions and applications to arrive
at where it is today. OL was first presented as a formal theory when Weber (1922)
identified the ability of bureaucracies to learn from experiences. As time progressed,
researchers developed finer analyses of what it meant to learn as an organization. An
extant work by Bavelas (1950), identified that not only do organizations have individuals
that learn in them…the organizations themselves take on a progressive capacity to
perform differently, essentially, they can learn. He developed a simple exercise to prove
his concept. He formed two groups of five members each and had them perform a task,
which required them to share information that is given to the members individually. The
first group’s members were identified as Al, A2, A3, A4, and A5. The second group was
comprised of individuals identified as B1, B2, B3, B4, and B5. Group A was arranged in
a hub and spoke pattern and the B's in a loop pattern, see Figure 6. After the participants
were thoroughly trained in the task, they began communicating; Group A via the member
in the middle and Group B via the person next to them going around the circle. After a
number of additional trials, Al and B1 were interchanged. The groups continued to use
their respective patterns. After a few more trials, A2 and B2 were switched, then A3 with
B3, and so on until the original hub and spoke group was populated by B1 through B5,
and the original circle group with A1 through A5. In the end, the original A's and B's
switched how they communicated as they switched organizations. It demonstrated an
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emergent (at that time) property of an organization—a persistence of pattern that survives
a complete replacement of the individuals in a group or organization (Simon, 1991).

Figure 6: OL Experiment (Bavelas, 1950)
The above example supports the view that the diffusion of information comes not
only via formal manuals, training, and other explicit modes, but also from the informal
efforts to function as productive member in the organization (Lave and Wenger, 2001).
In the experiment, the newcomers modified their previous training to match their
surroundings. Learning can be abstract learning, or the practice of the actual work
performed by members of an organization (Brown and Duguid, 1991). Some authors
suggest that the informal methods of discussing organizational norms, practices and
asking, “how are things done around here” from perceived organizational experts are
more influential on OL than formal efforts (Brown and Duguid, 1991). OL becomes a
relatively intangible strategic resource in the SCM process, as such, it can help to develop
a competitive advantage for the company (Biotto et al., 2012; Flint et al., 2008;
Panayides, 2007). The competitive advantage is realized by members responding to
22

changes in the internal and external environment, specifically correcting or elevating
errors in the firm’s functions (Esper et al., 2007). This perspective brings OL in close
contact, and in fact supporting, the KBV and RBV of the firm (Manuj
AymanYazdanparast, Atefeh, 2013).
The above findings frame an important question that has permeated the area of OL
since its inception. Where does learning and knowledge reside in a firm (Epple et al.,
1991)? If it resides completely in the physical aspects of the firm (training manuals,
equipment, technology, etc.) then every shift at a production plant should perform very
similar regardless of the workers. Conversely, if the elements of the firm can change or
be removed, and the firm continues to function well, then knowledge appears to reside in
the individuals. However, there is likely a combination of the two locations (Epple et al.,
1991). Others have proposed that knowledge resides solely in the individual (Simon,
1991). He proposes that OL only occurs in one of two ways: either by the learning of its
members or by incorporating new members with new knowledge. However, he contends
that although the learning is solely by the members, it is what those members know in
common that is manifested as OL. In other words, OL is the social aspect of individual
learning (Simon, 1991). His view is contrasted by the Bavelas two-group example above
and current perspectives that attribute the collective knowledge to the actual organization
(Esper et al., 2007). Multiple researchers have proposed models to identify how
individual knowledge relates to OL (Cohen, 1991; March, 1991). One proposed model
suggests that there are four progressive constructs that facilitate the integration of
individual knowledge into knowledge possessed by the organization (Crossan et al.,
1999). Their proposition is that individuals obtain knowledge through the methods
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previously discussed and achieve the ability to intuitively “know” how to act. Next, they
interpret various situations and determine how to act upon their intuitions. Then, the
individuals know how their knowledge and actions affect their tasks; they integrate their
knowledge. The final step is for processes to become permanent through formal and
informal transfers to other members to achieve institutionalization. Thus, OL occurs via
intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalization (Crossan et al., 1999). If we
accept this model or similar models that show a progression from individual learning to
OL, then the goal would be to facilitate and speed the transition from individual to
organization (Esper et al., 2007).
Some organizations have evolved from a group of individuals with collective
knowledge into synergistic functioning entities, as seen in the world of manufacturing as
it became more diverse, intertwined, and expansive (Langley, 1986). Weick (1991)
researched how well manufacturing operations were able to learn, when learning was
defined, in the traditional manner, as performing a task differently when presented with
the same stimulus. Weick proposed that firms also learn to produce the same response
when presented with different stimuli. He explains that a company that is able to produce
goods at a steady rate when a supply disruption occurs is an example of different
stimulus, but same response. This reversal of same-different to different-same presented
a conceptually new way to perceive and study OL. “The goal is to construct a theoretical
representation of the sequence of events that occurs while stimulus information is
transformed by perceptual and cognitive operations into the encoded forms that are
preserved in organized memory" (Estes, 1988, p. 362). This definition of learning for
individuals has increasingly been applied to both individuals in an organization and the
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organization itself (Weick, 1991). If one is to accept that an organization can learn, then
there should be research measuring the rate at which an organization learns. Yelle (1979)
proposed that organizations have learning curves; he tested his hypothesis in
manufacturing settings and found that OL is related to performance and can be measured
similar to individual learning curves. Other research called the phenomenon an
“experience curve” or “progress curve” (Argote, 2013); yet, the concept is similar to
Yelle’s (1979) findings. With the concept of a SC as an entity or organization itself
gaining acceptance (Cooper et al., 1997), the concept of OL has further extended to the
collaborative environment necessary for the SC to function (Biotto et al., 2012).
Therefore, literature has identified knowledge and learning as occurring at both the
individual and organizational levels.
The trend of OL literature indicates that it is becoming more widely accepted and
more broadly applied in business settings, including SCM. Furthermore, more
universities are offering OL as a course in undergraduate and graduate business fields of
study (Argote, 2013). The concept of OL has a solid foundation, established in multiple
disciplines; the future of OL looks to be of immense value to multiple fields, including
reducing errors in the shipping process.
Organizational Learning as a Theory
In the SCM literature, researchers have been calling for a greater focus on how OL
affects SC performance (Richey et al., 2010; Schmenner et al., 2009). Authors tend to
focus either on organizational learning as the actual organization learning (such as
corporate knowledge), or the authors focus on the individual learning. SCM addresses
OL much like it addresses human error: it is perceived as strategically important, but not
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well understood (Lee et al., 2013). Managers using the Toyota Production System attest
that individual learning and performance has a great impact on the overall production
system (López et al., 2005). Despite the lack of SCM literature focusing on OL, it has
found acceptance as a theory in some literature (Argyris and Schon, 1996; Fiol and Lyles,
1985). Its growth into a theory is due to the importance it has on firm performance, in
concert with an ever-increasing focus of academic research on the impact of OL (Miner
and Mezias, 1996). Specifically, OL as a theory is important in SCM due to the impact is
has, not only on firm performance, but how it affects overall SC performance (Hult et al.,
2003).
Despite the logically deduced theoretical link that organizational resources such as
OL can improve customer relationships and give rise to higher service quality (Hult et al.,
2000), relatively few SC studies have been devoted to empirically testing the effects of
organizational learning (Hult et al., 2003). The acknowledgement of how important OL
is as a strategy for competitive advantage has been accepted in the marketing field longer
than in SCM (Panayides, 2007). Thus, a review of OL literature finds more support in
marketing and organizational behavior literature than in SCM literature. SC managers
are still seeking for more conclusive answers of how OL influences their SC specific
organizations (Hult et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2013).
As more firms shift from employee task-training to knowledge-based learning, the
importance of OL theory will likely grow (Bowersox et al., 2000). With task-training,
the employee knows how to perform their assigned task regardless of the upstream or
downstream processes. Conversely, knowledge-based learning in SCM settings, requires
a more holistic approach to learning, such as teaching via multiple mediums (Hine and
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Goul, 1998). As we expand the concept of a learning organization, we can see that the
concept logically applies across entire supply chains. Therefore, additional benefits
could be realized from learning across the broader entity of the supply chain. The result
of the learning organization is that firm performance improves by developing learning
skills and harnessing the knowledge of its employees. However, according to Mangan
and Christopher’s (2005) assessment, logistics organizations may not be the best
examples of learning organizations. They state that SCM has placed far less of an
emphasis on the growth and development of personnel than on operational efficiency and
improving customer relations. A better use of OL by SCM would be to conduct research
applicable to practitioners that also solidifies OL theory as an integral part of SC
performance. Other fields that contain a social element have invested more in OL theory;
the work achieved in related fields serves to bolster the position that SCM performance
could be improved through a better understanding of how individuals and organizations
learn.
In its current state, OL is inherently part of a multi-theoretical lens. Depending on
which field is studying OL, it has been related to organizational behavior (Cyert and
March, 1963), RBV (Olavarrieta and Ellinger, 1997), KBV (Chiva and Alegre, 2005).
Authors who present OL as a theory identify its applicability both managers and
academia. Theoretical implications for OL relate to how an idea of performance can be
impacted by who, what, when, where, why, and how we learn as individuals and as
organizations. OL theory has gained ground as conceptual models have permeated the
literature. The proliferation and acceptance of common models not only benefits the
theory, but aids practitioners who want to know how all this actually affects their
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organization. Managerial implications for OL are growing as the theory helps
practitioners gain understanding of how they can disseminate information and integrate
knowledge in their organization.
Human Error Theories
The types of errors that a person can make vary based on settings and activity (Gel et
al., 2010). Therefore, researchers have developed and employ varied models and theories
with unique characteristics making them more fitting for specific settings. Numerous
methods have been developed for assessing system reliability in regards to human error.
The technique for human error rate prediction (THERP), systemic human error reduction
and prediction approach (SHERPA), task analysis for error identification (TAFEI),
human cognitive reliability (HCR), a technique for human error analysis (ATHENA) and
the cognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) are just a few of the
methods for determining how human error-rates affect overall system reliability (Swain,
1990). This research does not compare each method; rather, the intention is to highlight
current literature showing how the field addresses human reliability.
The Normal Accident Theory developed by Charles Perrow proposes two related
dimensions, interactive complexity and loose/tight coupling (Perrow, 1983). He explains
that these two items determine a system’s susceptibility to accidents. Interactive
complexity is the presence of unfamiliar, unplanned, and/or unexpected of events. These
events are often not visible or at least not readily perceived. He defines a tightly coupled
system as being highly interdependent and having each part of the system linked to many
other parts. This relationship means that a change in one part of the system will
potentially affect all of the system. Thus a tightly coupled system would respond quickly
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to errors, while a loosely coupled or decoupled systems would be able to absorb errors
without destabilization (Perrow, 1983). System accidents that occur in systems with both
interactive complexity and tight coupling will likely not be resolved before causing
system-wide consequences. Like Reason, he concludes that accidents are inevitable in
systems, yet he does provide suggestions for improved safety (Reason, 1990). The basic
goal is to reduce the degree to which a system is tightly coupled (Marais et al., 2004). He
is advocating measures to increase system resiliency.
Bedny and Karwowski looked at the warehouse operations of “picking and packing”
orders (Bedny and Karwowski, 2003). They assigned a probability of error based upon
how often workers fail to complete the task-element in an acceptable manner. The
original efforts up through the work by Bendy and Karwowski show that managers can
look at sub-tasks to find where improvements will have the most impact the overall errorrate. This ability to assess the overall probability of error continues to be researched to
see how it can foster a culture of safety (Galar et al., 2011). However, there are
limitations to these human reliability analyses HRAs; some even call them
counterproductive to increasing safety (Leveson, 2011; Marais et al., 2004). Other
research has used empirical measures to develop error-rates for a given task (Berger and
Ludwig, 2007). While researching the impact of auditory feedback devices, Berger and
Ludwig found that pickers had an error rate of about 2.44 errors per 1,000 cases picked
(Berger and Ludwig, 2007).
Swain presents a detailed analysis of how HRA can be used by organizations. The
article presents the needs for HRA, types of HRA, and limitations of HRA. He contends
that the main use of HRA is to facilitate the broader probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
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of a system. In particular, he states that “as equipment becomes more reliable, human
errors contribute relatively more to system problems” (Swain, 1990). For example, in
nuclear power plants human error has been estimated to account for over 90% of the
estimated probability for accident scenarios. When seeking to understand human
reliability, Swain proposes that the analysis has both qualitative and quantitative
components. The qualitative components relate to proposing potential means in which an
error can occur. Much of this analysis takes place before the system is built in order to
design a more resilient. The quantitative component is comprised of measurements of
human error probabilities (HEPs). The HEPs are calculated based on a detailed task
analysis and provide a rate of errors over a given period of time or number of
occurrences. Although the PRA, and consequently, HRA, are still conducted and provide
a valuable tool for system design and operations, they do have limitations. First, the
HRA could be calculated with less-than-adequate data. This problem leads to the use of
stop-gap models and subject-matter experts (SMEs) to provide estimates. Also,
standardized measurements, such as psychosocial instruments, have to be calibrated for
given settings and systems. The estimates can be used for simulations, but if the
parameters were incorrect, the variance is propagated further through the simulation.
There is also a lack of validated models that have taken proposed HRAs and then
compared the calculated rates to the finished operating system’s rates. As with all
estimates, there is also a limitation from the assumptions made in order to complete the
analysis. Finally, there is a limitation of performance shaping factors such as attitudes,
cultural differences and irrational behavior. All of these limitations are commonly
accounted for by increased estimate variances and higher HEPs (Swain, 1990). Swain
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provides suggestions for increasing system reliability in the presence of less-thanadequate data; his proposals are presented in the final section of this paper along with
other mitigation strategies.
The above research lead to the creation of a widely accepted model of human-error,
the generic error-modeling system (GEMS). This is the model adopted by this research.
Its ubiquitous nature in human factors, psychology and management fields means that it
has influenced much research by its structures, even if not explicitly stated. The GEMS
has its foundations in the work of Rasmussen and Rouses in the early 1980s, but was
synthesized and popularized by James Reason and Donald Norman throughout the 1980s
and 1990s (Rasmussen, 1987; Reason, 1990; Rouse, 1983). The GEMS proposes three
types of errors based on three types of performance. The execution stage of cognitive
processing is where most actions occur and functions at the skill-based level. The errors
at this stage are manifested as slips and lapses. Slips and lapses are errors due to failures
in execution and/or storage of an action sequence (Reason, 1990). The next type of error
occurs at the rule-based level of performance. Errors at this level are classified as rulebased mistakes. They are based on faulty rules for execution and associated with storage
cognitive processes. A faulty rule will lead to a “strong-but-wrong” response. These
types of error are often harder to detect as rapidly as skill-based errors. In fact, if there
are not subsequent checks, the mistake may never be found (Stewart and Chase, 1999).
Finally, the third level of performance is the knowledge-based level and invokes planning
cognitive processes. Here, mistakes require feedback because the individual is
consciously aware of the problem and recognizes the need for problem solving (Reason,
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1990). These three levels of performance provided the foundation for Reason’s proposal
of the “Swiss Cheese” model, see Figure 7.

Figure 7: Accident Causal Model; aka “Swiss Cheese Model” (Reason, 1990)

The fundamental concept of his model is that accidents are rarely, if ever, the result of
a single error. Normally, a single error is detected at a subsequent step and remedied
before the initial error results in an accident. However, sometimes the subsequent failsafes also fail. The series of errors was compared to slices of Swiss cheese that all
happen to have holes lined up in such a fashion that an error flows through multiple
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checks. Reason further proposes that each slice of cheese represents specific aspects of
the accident environment. Figure 7 shows how Reason proposes organizational
influences, unsafe supervision, and preconditions for unsafe acts all facilitate conditions
for latent failures. These hazards lead to an environment were active failures flow
through expected checks to cause a mishap. The weaknesses of the latent layers are not
necessarily active failures but may manifest when they should catch an unsafe act; for
example, fatigue or complacency (Jennings, 2008). Shappell and Wiegmann modified
Reason’s model by including 19 specific causal categories and called it the human factors
analysis and classification system (HFACS) (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2004). The
categories are subordinate definitions for four main domains that mirror Reason’s model
as can be seen in Figure 8 (Jennings, 2008). An analysis of each category is beyond the
scope of this comparison; but as an example, consider the modifications to the unsafe acts
segment. Shappell and Wiegmann added errors as subordinate to unsafe acts and as a
peer to violations. Errors can be classified further into decision errors based on
procedural errors, poor choices, or problem solving errors. Skill-based errors are
technique based or “stick and rudder” errors. Perceptual errors are related to decision and
skill-based errors, but are based on some faulty perception, often due to a degraded
operating environment. The other category for unsafe acts is violations. Violation can be
routine, such as driving 5 mph over the posted speed limit. Violations can also be
exceptional, such as flying an airplane under a bridge (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2004).
The GEMS model provided the basis for the Department of Defense (DOD) version of
the HFACS.
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The DOD-HFACS, see Figure 9, was developed in 2003 in response to a mandate by
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to reduce the number of accidents in the DOD.
He proposed the goal of a 50% reduction over two years (Jennings, 2008). To facilitate
this endeavor, he proposed a revamp of how we look at accidents. The intent was to
develop a single structure to analyze the role human factors play in aviation, ground,
weapons, afloat, space and off-duty mishaps.
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Figure 8: HFACS (Jennings, 2008)
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Figure 9: DOD-HFACS (Jennings, 2008)
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The existing HFACS was designed based on aviation accidents. The DOD wanted a
structure that would work for all types of military accidents. In 2005, all branches and
agencies of the DOD agreed to use the DOD-HFACS to investigate accidents (O’Connor,
2008). The DOD-HFACS is very similar to the existing HFACS with the following
exceptions, identified by O’Connor, that make it more applicable to non-flying situations
as well.


‘routine violations’ and ‘exceptional violations’ were dropped as categories of
‘violations’



‘adverse mental state’ was dropped as a category of ‘conditions of the
individual’



‘cognitive factors’, ‘psycho-behavioral factors’, and ‘perceptual factors’ were
added as ‘conditions of the individual’



‘crew resource management’ and ‘personal readiness’ were dropped as
categories in ‘personnel factors’



‘coordination/communication/ planning factors’ and ‘self-imposed stress’
were added as categories in ‘personnel factors’

The resulting DOD-HFACS diagram is very similar to the original HFACS diagram
as can be seen by comparing Figure 8 and Figure 9. The DOD-HFACS includes lower
levels of analysis for each of the categories visible in Figure 9. The additional categories
provide analysts guidance as they use the system for assessing root causes of accidents.
A case study of the system was conducted by an Army safety officer, (Jennings, 2008)
showing how the DOD-HFACS has been used to assess high mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) rollovers. He attributes the high number of rollovers in
2004 to the technical modifications made to “up-armor” a vehicle. The added protection
changed the vehicles’ center of gravity and made them more top-heavy and consequently
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more likely to rollover. Jennings walks through the use of the DOD-HFACS for an
individual rollover, noting how the aggregate analyses of numerous rollovers lead to
changes in training and standard operating procedures. While there are many factors
affecting rollover rates, Figure 10 is an example of a successful accident-remediation.

Figure 10: Rollover Assessment, DOD-HFACS (Jennings, 2008)

One last system for assessing errors and understanding system safety will be
presented because it contrast the basics of the previous systems and seeks to replace them
(Leveson, 2011). Leveson developed a system based on her unsatisfied experiences with
previous models. Her proposal is that previous models are insufficient for accessing
failures given today’s technology. She contends that previous models are based on
analogue technology that behaves very differently than the digital systems in use today.
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Modern systems are built with such complexity that “they are beyond our ability to
intellectually manage” (Leveson, 2011, p. 4). The premise of her proposed system is
built upon challenging existing assumptions and proposing seven new assumptions. The
first assumption she challenges states that previous models operate on the assumption that
safety can be calculated like reliability rates. That is, if we make each component less
prone to error (higher reliability rates), then the entire system will be less likely to fail.
She challenges this assumption by saying that a system can be highly reliable and highly
unsafe at the same time.
A system can fail even when none of the components fail; this phenomenon attests to
the complexity of our systems (Dekker et al., 2011). For example, the Mars Polar Lander
crash-landed due to an unforeseen interaction between systems that were individually
highly reliable (and worked as programmed). The reverse thrusters received a signal that
the landing leg system had deployed. Although the landing legs deployed properly, when
programmed, the thrusters were programmed to accept this signal as an indication that the
landing sequence was complete. Therefore, the system thought the landing sequence was
complete and shut down the thrusters while still airborne. Another example occurred in a
batch chemical reactor in England. The system was programmed to hold all variables
constant when an anomaly was detected. An anomaly was detected just as a needed
cooling-valve was opening. The system halted the change of any variables, preventing
the valve from fully opening to provide the cooling water. The reactor overheated
releasing contaminated steam into the atmosphere (Leveson, 2011). Occurrences such as
these lead to the new assumption that systems with high levels of reliability are neither
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necessary nor sufficient for the system to be safe. The remaining six assumption
replacements are provided in Table 1.
Table 1: STAMP Assumptions (Leveson, 2011)

In relation to human errors, Leveson suggests changing how we design systems to
compliment the human ability to control the system. Currently, many systems have
humans doing tasks that are better fit for automation and have automated decisions that
could be made better by humans. An example is to design systems with incremental
algorithms that require human interaction along the path to the desired outcome. This is
based upon the idea that in simple systems, the errors are normally errors of commission.
For example, the operator incorrectly actuated the wrong control. Conversely, in
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complex systems, most errors are errors of omission. The system is working in an
automated fashion and the operator fails to conduct a step needed in the middle of the
automated process. The occurrence of omission errors can be reduced by maintaining the
operators’ vigilance throughout automated processes. A simple example is found in our
computers as we try to delete a file. If we hit the delete key, the system could completely
erase the file and all records of its existence (to a degree not retrievable by the average
user). However, the process is broken into segments requiring user interaction when the
file is deleted, confirmed, when deleted from recycle bin, and again confirmed. Such
process changes will decrease the likelihood of an unintended outcome (Leveson, 2011).
The above assumptions and observations are all integrated into the Systems-Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). The goal of STAMP is to integrate safety into
the system design from the beginning. The author states that too often safety analyses
occur after an incident or late in the product use stage. Conversely, when using STAMP,
engineering a safer system requires designing the safety-control structure and controls
into the system as an inherent part of the system. However, the Air Force already has
supply systems (among many other systems with varying levels of interaction with
primary supply systems) in existence. Leveson suggests redesigning the system as
appropriate to obtain the benefits of a STAMP-based design. The STAMP is a relatively
new method and does not have the broad implementation of the HFACS. None-the-less,
the premise of integrating safety in the entire system design as proven to be effective for
reducing errors in varied systems (Khan et al., 2012; Lewis, 2013; Marais et al., 2004).
Some systems can be quite complex and the consequences for errors significant. Next,
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this research considers literature of these organizations, which require high levels of
reliability in operations.
Errors in High-reliability Organizations (HROs)
This research is concerned with errors in HROs due to the impact an error can have
upon the organization and society at large. There is a wide-range of organizations that
have been analyzed as HROs; researchers most often associated with HROs are Todd La
Porte, Gene Rochlin, Karlene Roberts, Karl Weick, and Paula Consolini (Marais et al.,
2004). HROs are enterprises with “missions involving processes that require
extraordinary measures to maintain low risk in the presence of disruptions that could
result in catastrophic events or fatalities” (Lewis, 2013). An HRO has also been
described as a social system that has developed a cultural sensitivity to social,
organizational, cognitive, and technical challenges; it accepts the challenges and
transforms them into opportunities for safety improvements (Bagnara et al., 2010). The
concept of six sigma states that in many circumstances 99% accuracy is not satisfactory.
Rather, through continued improvement error-rates can drop to less than 1 in 1,000,000.
This rate is referred to as six sigma because it is near the sixth standard deviation of
normally distributed data (Kwak and Anbari, 2006). An internet search will reveal a
number of motivating statistics about why 99.9% is not acceptable. For example, 99.9%
accuracy in maternity wards would result in twelve newborns going to the wrong parents
daily (Quinley, 2013).
Society accepts the need to have some systems extremely reliable, such as nuclear
power plants and commercial aircraft; however, less obvious processes also can have farreaching implications for those involved. For example, a sausage factory that distributes
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tainted meat can have deleterious effects for a large population. To effectively operate at
high levels of reliability, individual tasks must be completed with high accuracy, or have
redundant systems to increase reliability (Roberts et al., 2001). Bierly and Spender state
that HROs become increasingly complex and often experience more noticeable accidents
than other organizations (Bierly and Spender, 1995). Therefore, high-risk organizations
transform into HROs based on the sensitivity they often develop in response to the
isolated events that could trigger larger accidents. They look at the single enterprise of
nuclear submarines. Roberts, et al. conversely, state that peer organizations can have
very different levels of reliability based on managerial decisions (Roberts et al., 2001).
Roberts et al. propose three keys to enhancing reliability in complex organizations.
First, the organization will aggressively seek to know what it does not already know. The
quest to reduce the “unknown” will empower their employees by spending more on
training, exercises, and process changes than other organizations. The result is
employees who are able to detect unusual or unexpected problems. The second proposed
key is to balance efficiency with reliability. “Firms that have reduced numbers of
accidents are fully aware of the simple truth that what gets measured gets managed”
(Roberts et al., 2001). To obtain high levels of reliability, the authors contend that
organizations must obtain feedback via surveys, focus groups, and interviews to ensure
that the real goals of the organization are the same as what management believes them to
be. For reliability and efficiency to be fully balanced, incentive systems must reflect this
balance. They recommend instituting an accounting system to capture the costs of having
and preventing exercises. The third and final key they propose is to communicate the
organizational big picture to everyone.
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Organizations must also empower individual workers to understand their impact on
the overall system. Roberts et al. (2001) provide the example of the Herald of Free
Enterprise passenger ferry. In 1987, it was transporting 460 passengers and 80
crewmembers in addition to vehicles. The helmsman was responsible for checking the
open door indicator light. He failed to check the light and the ferry started across the
channel with the door open. Water inundated the ferry and it sank, resulting in 188
deaths (Roberts et al., 2001); his error impacted much more than his localized duty. An
organization that necessitates high levels of reliability should ensure that all workers
understand how their tasks affect the larger operations (Roberts et al., 2001).
The DOD can be analyzed as an HRO; at a lower level, even individual mission sets
within the Air Force share characteristics of an HRO (Alonso et al., 2006; Baker et al.,
2006). As HROs, the units within the DOD can be improved by many of the same
measures that aid other HROs; however, there are unique attributes that both hinder and
help military units increase their reliability (Bagnara et al., 2010). The military is
accustomed to conducting exercises and developing robust contingency plans. Yet, the
military has not traditionally considered it vital that members know how their assigned
tasks fit into the larger mission. We are often content to provide virtually all members
tactical knowledge, but reserve operational and strategic information that reveals how
each component works together. While the nature of warfare dictates an element of
secrecy, some tasks may benefit from informing the operators of how they support the
entire mission.
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Error mitigation strategies
Swain (1990) states that better implementation of human factor considerations will
reduce the likelihood of an error going unnoticed. He provides five examples where most
systems are currently underutilizing human factor resources and can be improved. The
first area of improvement is to realize that 99% error-free is often unacceptable in highrisk systems such as discussed above. The current mode of operation is to rely on
difficult-to-follow written procedures; an alternative would be to make relatively minor
changes in processes or system structures to better mitigate the impact a single error will
have on the system (Reason, 2004).
Another area for improvement is to implement a system of unannounced emergency
exercises with “table-top” walkthroughs. It appears that managers have heeded his
recommendation. Currently, the Department of Homeland Security exercises civilian
organizations that have the potential for catastrophic emergencies…such as a nuclear
power plant. Individual plants also have implemented measures akin to Swain’s
recommendations. The Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant has it workers conduct
normal operations for three weeks, then has one week of training and exercises (Roberts
et al., 2001). He also states that checklists for normal operating procedures are
commonly used during emergencies. A better practice would be to develop emergency
operating procedures that can be accessed based on symptoms. This would be similar to
pilots having normal procedural checklists in written format in addition to memorized
“bold-face” checklists for specific emergencies.
Finally, he states that displays and controls should be organized to aid the creation of
accurate mental models when there is an error (Swain, 1990). A personal example was
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observed in the C-17 aircraft. Its fuel system controls are laid out in the shape of the
aircraft. To transfer fuel from one tank to another, the pilots active a switch that is
located graphically on the panel between the tanks. When there is a problem in a given
location of the fuel system, the location blinks. Additional initiatives to mitigate errors
have been popularized by the Lean initiatives and the TPS (Takahashi et al., 2007).
For example, organizations following TPS often implement the kanban procedures
for scheduling the movement of inventory (Nolan, 2000). A simple kanban example may
function as a three bin system where one bin resides on the production floor and contains
one type of part needed for assembly. When the bin is empty, the kanban card is
displayed. Then, a worker takes the bin to the local inventory store and switches it for a
full bin and new kanban card. The inventory store continues the exchange with the
supplier, filling the third bin. The process cycles and, when working as designed, the
worker will not accidently run out of inventory nor will there be an excess of inventory at
the production center (Takahashi et al., 2007).
A more error-prevention focused example from TPS is the use of poka-yokes. Pokayoke is a Japanese term meaning “fool-proof” or “mistake-proof.” The poka-yoke
principle is to design a system so that it cannot be accomplished incorrectly under normal
circumstances (Nolan, 2000). An example is electrical plug-ins; if a device requires a
specific polarity, one prong will be wider than the other preventing users from inserting
the plug upside down. Other applications certainly advocate the concept of poka-yoke
designs apart from TPS. Nolan proposes that processes can be designed to reduce the
error-rate of humans using the process. The example he provides is receiving cash from
an ATM. Since the objective is receiving cash, some customers will walk away before
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the transaction is finalized and the card returned. However, if the process is changed so
that the cash is not dispensed until the very end (after the receipt and card are dispensed)
then fewer people will forget their card in the ATM. He states that the same concepts
could be initiated in hospitals to reduce errors (Nolan, 2000). For example,
manufacturers could make anesthetic connections for different applications in such a way
that they cannot be hooked together incorrectly. A process change example would be to
not stock easily confused items in the same areas (Reason, 2004).
The DOD has employed some of the above suggestions to reduce accidents and errorrates. The DOD changed how it managed the storage of nuclear weapon related material
(NWRM) after two highly publicized events when NWRM was mistaken for other
inventory (Snyder et al., 2013). The Air Force and Navy implemented the
recommendation to store critical items that are easily confused in separate locations.
Now, all NWRM is stored in a physically separate part of the warehouse. An ongoing
area of improvement is new training methods (Kwak and Anbari, 2006). Roberts et al.
state that formal training can be effective for improving workers’ ability to recognize
when they commit an error. However, in the most reliable organizations, the formal
training is accompanied by strong cultures that recognize that the system is not perfect
and that improvements can be noticed at all levels (Roberts et al., 2001). The DOD is
still formulating how it can foster a culture of safety when our profession inherently
participates in high-risk activities. We cannot eliminate all dangers or human errors.
Reason suggests the goal is to understand that processes involving humans will have
human error; however, creating a culture of safety will enable the mission to continue
even in the presence of infrequent errors (Reason, 1998).
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Error Theories in the Air Force
The models presented above have provided varying levels of utility for the Air Force.
They all have something to offer, not the least of which is to get us thinking about how
human factors have affected other organizations. Additionally, they have guided this
research to know what type of errors should be expected in a HRO and in a supply
setting. While the above models are quite different in some regards, they have elements
that can have been integrated into an Air Force initiatives to improve supply chain
performance. System design efforts seek to reduce error in a system by changing the
fundamental system structure and its workings (Daouk and Leveson, 2001). This is the
hallmark of the Leveson’s Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model.
Leveson suggests that a system can be designed from the ground up in such a fashion that
it will preemptively reduce the opportunities for error. She also states that if a system is
already in place, then it must be redesigned using the STAMP model to gain the most
benefit (Leveson, 2011). The Air Force supply structure is already in place, and has
many processes that are deeply rooted across the entire federal government.
The Air Force is constrained by international agreements, Environmental Protection
Agency requirements, DOD requirements, and our own publications. Leveson’s model
provides insight into how both existing and revamped automated processes can best
operate with users. Her model suggests that improvements can be made to both the
physical structure and the processes. An example of a partial redesign occurred with the
implementation of a new Air Force supply transportation protective services checklist,
see Figure 11. This process was redesigned to synthesize guidance from multiple
agencies. Part of the process is automated and part of it requires user input and
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interactions. While the checklist was developed before Leveson’s 2011 book, the new
process incorporated the concept of involving the user at key steps in the process. This
same checklist also included elements from the GEMS.
Although the Air Force integrated some newer methods found in human error
literature, it continues to use DOD-HFACS as the primary human error analysis tool.
The DOD-HFACS can be implemented by users with significantly less training and
provide more consistent results than a systems-approach that varies more frequently
(Jennings, 2008). Even though the DOD-HFACS has a defined structure, it is not static;
it can be modified by adjusting pertinent factors in each subsection. The DOD-HFACS is
most applicable to large-scale errors or accidents; whereas, the GEMS can provide a
means of remediation for less complex errors. While there can be many consequences of
error depending on the organization and system (Marais et al., 2004), errors that affect
inventory records are particularly egregious in the supply chain management (Kök and
Shang, 2004).
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Figure 11: TPS Checklist (AF Form 4387)
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Inventory Record Inaccuracies
As firms operate with, and maintain, physical inventory they also keep a record of the
inventory’s location. The degree to which the inventory is tracked varies greatly, from
the legal minimum showing purchases and sales to total asset visibility using state-of-theart tracking technologies such as radio frequency identification (RFID) systems (DOD,
2003; Rinehart, 1960). Occasionally, the physical inventory quantity is different from the
inventory record quantity. The difference between the inventory record and the physical
inventory creates an inventory record inaccuracy (IRI) (Iglehart and Morey, 1972). The
vast majority of inventory management literature does not account for the differences in
physical and recorded inventories (Kang and Gershwin, 2005). The exception is
literature focused on IRI. For this section of the literature review, this research will look
at the history of research regarding improving record accuracy. The goal of this section
is to provide a source for understanding the field of inventory accuracy literature,
including presenting sources of IRI, solutions for IRI and to highlight opportunities for
future research.
IRI adversely impacts business activities that rely upon accuracy for demand data,
forecasts, and replenishments (Thiel et al., 2010). It is estimated that companies spend
about 1% percent of annual sales on automated decision support tools (Steidtmann,
1999). Inaccurate data undermines the billions of dollars spent on these automated
systems. Most firms, and academic literature, have not accounted for the variance
between physical inventory and data records. They are either unaware of the
discrepancies or have operated on the assumption that the difference between the two is
small enough that it will not impact operations (Fleisch and Tellkamp, 2005). However,
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empirical and analytical research has shown that the differences can be stark and have a
deleterious effect upon operations (Iglehart and Morey, 1972; Kang and Gershwin, 2005).
This research will use the historical evolutionary perspective (Shah and Ward, 2007)
to first look at the past development of IRI research and its use in the supply chain
management (SCM) literature from its early references, progressing to how SC managers
presently view it. Then, this research will expand the review of IRI literature by first
providing an overview of IRI terms, including sources and solutions from IRI literature.
IRI Background
The general definition of IRI is that it occurs when there are discrepancies between
the physical quantity and the stock keeping unit (SKU) record quantity (DeHoratius and
Raman, 2008). Rinehart (1960) is the first researcher to identify IRI as an obstacle to
operational performance. From a case study of a federal government supply facility,
Rinehart documents substantial discrepancies between recorded and actual inventory
quantities. IRI also includes record discrepancies relating to location. If an item is
misplaced, it is unable to fill a customer demand until found (Rekik, 2011). IRI can lead
to items becoming “frozen” or “inflated.” A frozen record shows that there are sufficient
items in stock to meet demand but the physical inventory is not available for purchase
(Barratt et al., 2010). This phenomenon happens with automated data processing systems
because the system indicates sufficient inventory (above the reordering point). The
inventory level will remain static or frozen, due to the fact that no physical inventory is
available for customers to initiate a demand for the automated data system. Conversely,
if the system shows less inventory than is physically available, then a purchase can
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prematurely generate a requisition resulting in excessive on-hand inventory (Barratt et al.,
2010).
The extent of the problem has been assessed heuristically (Thompson, 1985),
empirically (DeHoratius and Raman, 2008), and analytically (De Kok et al., 2008).
DeHoratius & Raman (2008) conducted research with a large electronics retailer and
found that out of about 370,000 SKUs, more than 65% of the inventory records did not
match the physical inventory levels. Additionally, 20% of the inventory records differed
from the physical stock by six or more items. Barratt et al. (2010) found that in only a
ten-day period, physical inventory swung above and below the corresponding system
record. The problem of IRI can be quite drastic and have a significant impact on
reordering policies (Iglehart and Morey, 1972). The discrepancies can arise for a myriad
of reasons, the reasons most often cited in the IRI literature include shrinkage,
misplacement, random yields from suppliers, and transaction errors. Each of these causes
have a human error component.
IRI Causes
Shrinkage is the term used to describe attrition of inventory over time; it is also called
stock loss. The most common forms of shrinkage are thefts and accidental damage by
workers and customers (Rekik and Jemai, 2009).Some have divided shrinkage into
malicious and non-malicious categories (Beck and Chapman, 2003; Rekik and Sahin,
2012). Non-malicious shrinkage includes losses due to spoilage, obsolescence,
demonstration wear, and accidental damage (Atali et al., 2009). Malicious shrinkage
includes fraud, unauthorized consumption, and theft. However, most human errormodels are focused on the actions of well-intentioned workers and do not address
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malicious behaviors as performance errors (Reason, 1990). Shrinkage is unique from the
other sources of IRI because it only results in negative discrepancies, whereas the other
forms of IRI can result in a net positive or net loss. Therefore, shrinkage, especially
unknown stock losses, result in overestimates of actual stock on hand (Fleisch and
Tellkamp, 2005).
Misplacement errors result in inventory that is not readily accessible for use or sale.
The material is in the facility somewhere, but the location is unknown to the person
seeking to purchase or use the item (Kang and Gershwin, 2005). The item could have
been misplaced by a customer moving it from shelf to shelf. Misplacements can also
result from employee errors while handling the item at any point during receiving, storing
or stocking processes (Rekik, Sahin, Jemai, et al., 2008). The items may be miscoded
and routed to the wrong location, or the workers may commit a handling mistake and
place the item in the incorrect location. Misplaced items appear to be a stock-out to
customers and can require significant man-hours for employees to track down misplaced
items. The extent of misplaced items can be large; Ton and Raman (2004) reported that,
in 2002, 4% of Amazon’s warehouse inventory was misplaced. Possibly related to
misplacement and other human induced IRI, is the phenomenon of satisficing (Winter,
2000). Schwartz et al. state that satisficing occurs when an individual “simply encounters
and evaluates goods until one is encountered that exceeds the acceptability threshold”
(2002). Although this research is often applied to economic choices, it has been show to
apply in other scenarios (Caplin et al., 2011).
Suppliers can also introduce IRI into the system by supplying incorrect quantities,
miscoded items, or defective products (Rekik, 2011). Bensoussan, Çakanyildirim, and
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Sethi (2007) found that shipments are frequently accepted and data updated in the
inventory information system without physical verification of the items. This practice
will lead to IRI that may not be discovered for great lengths of time, even years (Solis,
2004). Moreover, if the products delivered are counted but not inspected for usability,
then inaccuracies can manifest later in the process when subpar items are discovered
(Bensoussan et al., 2007).
Transaction errors normally occur at the receiving and outbound sides of the facility.
A common retail transaction error results from cashier scanning procedures. For
example, a customer may purchase three different flavored granola bars. They are all
identically priced and look somewhat similar. To quicken the checkout process, the
cashier may only scan the first bar then key in a multiplier of three. Or, they may
actually swipe the same bar three times and push the rest over to be bagged. When
cashiers do not scan each SKU, a transaction error occurs resulting in either and overage
or shortage of actual inventory in relation to the inventory data system. On the inbound
side, shipments that arrive from the suppliers have to be registered into the store
information system. If the items are incorrectly processed at this point, there will be a
resulting IRI (Kang and Gershwin, 2005). This error is closely related to the
aforementioned discrepancies from the suppliers’ shipments. It is possible for the data to
be incorrect due to multiple errors. The shipment could have the wrong, amount and be
miscoded. Later the same items could be misplaced or stolen. All of these factors
emphasize the benefits of having total asset visibility (Solis, 2004).
In addition to shrinkage, misplacement, supplier yield, and transaction errors,
researchers have considered other factors, although much less frequently. Causes such as
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employee turnover, RFID accuracy, and database management have all been considered
(DOD, 2003; Raman et al., 2001; Sari, 2008). Of particular note, is an experiment
conducted by Sheppard and Brown (1993) that considered: unit value, weigh-counting,
quantity on-hand, dollar value of stock on hand, number of places that the part was used,
and stockroom staff's rating of the error likelihood for a part. The authors found each of
the items to significantly impact IRI. Having considered some of the sources of IRI, this
research now turns to the common solutions presented in literature.
IRI Solutions
Periodic counting of all inventory on hand was the standard method of improving
record accuracy for many years and continues to be used by inventory managers (Rekik
and Sahin, 2012). The process involves counting all inventory on hand, then comparing
the results with the inventory information system. This method can cause service
interruptions by stopping manufacturing or warehouse operations during the counts; in
retail environments, the counts can be conducted during non-business or non-peak
business hours. In each of these circumstances, the count will incur some additional costs
(Rekik and Sahin, 2012). The goal of the count is to improve data accuracy; however,
the counts are conducted by fallible humans. One article estimated inventory counts to
be about 95% accurate. Thus, if the inventory records were highly accurate to begin
with, an inventory count may actually reduce the record accuracy (Millet, 1994). The
cost of counting high-cost items is often justified, but with low-cost items, it may be
more cost effective for a business to simply add more inventory and not count the items
(Gumrukcu et al., 2008). For example, compare the benefit of counting engine
assemblies versus counting each candy bar at every aisle in a large store. It is important
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to consider that adding inventory can be counterproductive for Lean operations (Kang
and Gershwin, 2005).
Cycle-counting was the first widespread alternative to periodic complete inventory
verification to appear in the literature (Iglehart and Morey, 1972; Smith, 1976) and is still
the most pervasive solution (Muller, 2011). Many have considered cycle-counting as the
panacea for inventory inaccuracies, calling it “the most systematic method of solving
inventory accuracy problems” (Gumrukcu et al., 2008). Cycle counting is the planned
continuous counting of a small set of items during a period (Backes, 1980). The overall
goal of cycle counting is defined as improving inventory accuracy. However, some
inventory managers can add the goals of identifying causes of inventory inaccuracy and
providing improvement in customer service levels by making the in-store operations
more effective (Gumrukcu et al., 2008). Managers must also consider the desired
accuracy of the records. A common benchmark is 95% (Muller, 2011). Cycle counting
avoids some of the cost of a periodic count because a smaller area can be counted with
less impact upon ongoing operations (Polakoff, 1987). A common technique of cycle
counting is to enact an “ABC” hierarchy (see Table 2). “A” items would be counted
more often because they are either more valuable or believed to pose more risk if
unavailable (Cantwell, 1985). Graff (1987) identifies fallacies of the ABC system for a
manufacturing setting. The often-overlooked “C” parts could cause production lines to
stop in the same way high velocity “A” items could.
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Table 2: ABC cycle counting example (Cantwell, 1985)

Class

# of Item
in Class

# of
Counts
Per Year

A

1800

6

B
C

4155
28687

3
1

Workdays Between
Counts
2 months = 40
workdays
4 months = 80
workdays
1 year = 240 workdays

Day
Available
for
Counting

Average
Daily
Counts

30

60

60
180

70
160

Zones provide another method to improve inventory accuracy. Articles that tested
this mitigation strategy were all manufacturing stockrooms. Nevertheless, the method
could be reasonably applied in other inventory settings; such as workers being
responsible for picking form certain warehouse zones (De Koster et al., 2007). Zoning is
implemented by placing specific individuals over a defined area of inventory or zone.
The individual is responsible for the inventory accuracy of their zone. The zoning
method gives the individual more responsibility and more control over their area of
operation (Sandras Jr. and Bolander, 1978).
Technology, as a means to improve inventory accuracy, is the focus of many recent
IRI articles. Some contend that inventory inaccuracy issues became apparent due to the
development of tracking technology (Kang and Gershwin, 2005). The barcode system is
the most commonly used inventory tracking and data capture technology in practice
(Sahin and Dallery, 2009). In 2001, five billion codes were scanned every day in 140
countries (Agarwal, 2001). Although the introduction of tracking systems significantly
reduced inventory inaccuracies, the existence of errors in inventory records are still
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commonly observed (Lee et al., 2004). For barcode systems, labels must be properly
positioned in order to be detected by readers. Otherwise operators must manually scan
products, increasing the opportunity for errors (Sahin and Dallery, 2009).
Another major technology available for tracking inventory is RFID systems
comprised of tags located on either the item itself or on the packaging, including
aggregated inventory such as a pallet. RFID has become so prevalent in many inventory
operations and in the literature, that there is a plethora of articles focusing just on RFID
technology (Delaunay et al., 2007). Many of the articles focusing on RFID technologies
address IRI as an area that will inherently improve with the adoption of the new
technology (Wang et al., 2010). The proponents of RFID systems state that it can
provide an automated “zero human intervention solution to the problem” (Hardgrave et
al., 2013). Others have taken a more reserved stance, citing limitations of the technology.
Studies have discovered that errors such as misread and no-read occur too often; one
study experienced only an eighty percent success rate in reading tags across various
conditions (Rekik, Sahin and Dallery, 2008). Others have found that radio frequencies
can be absorbed by liquids and reflected by metals (Uçkun et al., 2008). These
limitations leave room for further analysis and improvement in inventory tracking
systems.
The work by Dehoratius and Raman (2008) is unique (and frequently cited in
subsequently published articles) because the authors developed a model to test the
interaction of various factors that could likely impact IRI. They also work with a large
data set to develop their model. They found that fast turnover items (more transactions
per period for a given SKU) resulted in greater IRI (DeHoratius and Raman, 2008).
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However, researchers found the opposite to be true in other studies (Barratt et al., 2010).
The settings for each study are slightly different, thus the field needs more research to
help delineate conflicting findings.
Nachtmann, Waller, and Rieske (2010) add explicit consideration of demand error
caused by IRI. Continuing our granola bar example from above, if all three bars are
scanned as one type…there will be a false demand data for all three bars. Nachtmann et
al. (2010) mainly focus on the bar that shows three demands when there was actually
only one. Yet, there is also incorrect data for the other two bars that show no demand but
were purchased at the same rate as the first bar. They found demand error to affect the
system performance (probability of a stock-out) less than inventory errors. They
conclude that demand error primarily leads to problems in forecasting, which results in
larger safety stock (SS) values (Nachtmann et al., 2010). The increased SS can be
unnecessary and tie up capital, but does not lead to more stock-outs. Similarly, Sari
(2008) found that collaborative SC structures, where a four-echelon chain shared demand
data and inventory levels, experienced more disruption due to IRI than a vendor-managed
structure. Sari (2008) attributed the increased disruption from IRI to the presence of less
SS. Using the classic just-in-time analogy, water can be viewed as inventory covering up
a whole myriad of issues. As the water level lowers (inventory levels decrease), the
dangerous rocks become apparent (Wilson, 1996). One of those rocks is IRI; some the
articles have shown how firm performance can be impacted more drastically by IRI in
structures striving for lower inventory levels such as just-in-time, Lean and collaborativeplanning-forecasting-replenishment (Sari, 2008).
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IRI Solutions
Inventory record accuracy continues to challenge the Air Force, many manufacturers,
warehouses, and retailers. Researchers are still working towards a consensus on how to
manage IRI and adequate tools to manage IRI are still emerging (Mersereau, 2013).
Even within the area of cycle counting, managers can receive conflicting guidance. One
study noticed better performance with more frequent counts (Raman et al., 2001).
Conversely, another researcher found that warehouse inventory accuracy improved with
fewer cycle counts (Polakoff, 1987). Below are some of the existing solutions.
DeHoratius, Mersereau, and Schrage (2008) suggest firms have one of three options:
Prevention, Correction, or Integration to reduce IRI. Current literature contains examples
of each option. However, there is currently not a quantitative comparison of the efficacy
of different methods; although the collective knowledge-base seems to conclude that the
more you can do to address IRI, the better results you can achieve. The limitation is that
some solutions are not fitting for all firms, and even if many methods are fitting, they
may be cost prohibitive (De Koster et al., 2007). As the desired inventory accuracy
increases, limiting factors increase exponentially (costs, time, computational power, etc.).
It would be easier for company to improve from 60% to 90% accuracy than for them to
improve from 90% to 95% and so on (Miller, 1997).
Prevention: Prevention includes items such as employee training, management buyin, process changes, and supplier coordination (DeHoratius et al., 2008; Rekik and Sahin,
2012). For example, if a large source of a firm’s IRI stems from point-of-sale transaction
errors, then managers can focus training on this area. Referring to our earlier example of
the cashier scanning three granola bars, if the cashiers have been trained to scan one item
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then key in a multiplier number, retraining them to scan every SKU could prevent a
portion of the firm’s IRI.
Correction: The implementation of RFID technologies is an example of a prevention
method and a correction method depending on how it is utilized (Hardgrave et al., 2013).
If the RFID system, or any other tracking system, is used to maintain improved location
of inventory, then it is primarily a correction method. The manager will know that the
inventory is now in one location when the database previously showed it elsewhere; this
employment is used for active reconciliation of inventory records. For any tracking
system to serve as a prevention method, managers must review system reconciliations to
find root causes of the needed corrections (Atali et al., 2009).
Integration: A few simulations (Bai et al., 2012; DeHoratius and Raman, 2008; Kök
and Shang, 2007) found that desired performance levels can be achieved with IRI, as long
as there is an accurate estimate of the error. Thus, the inventory records do not
necessarily need to be 100% correct. However, this solution may lead to holding more
inventory to account for the IRI. Another proposed method called cycle-count policy
with state-dependent base-stock levels (CCABS) is a combination of corrective actions
and integration (Kök and Shang, 2007). CCABS calls managers to perform an inspection
only if the inventory recorded is less than a threshold level, and order up to a base-stock
level that varies depending on the number of periods since the last inspection. They state
that this method can reduce costs while still achieving performance goals.
Other recommendations include collaborating with the accounting department to
conduct more accurate cycle counts (Backes, 1980; Kohn, 1978). Effective solutions will
likely require human resource elements such as training and education (Witt, 2006). As
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early as 1978, Weber conducted a controlled experiment assessing the impacts of IRI and
auditors responses with the goal of improving human performance. One study stated that
the most important requirement for a successful cycle counting program is top
management support (Cantwell, 1985). The same is likely true for any serious effort to
improve inventory records. In conclusion, IRI can cause and are caused by factors
involving humans; these factors, therefore, should be studied when seeking to improve
IRI.
Psychological Measures
The extent individuals can vary may be unlimited; however, most of these differences
have commonalities and small deviations go largely undetected (Goldberg, 1990;
Rasmussen, 1982). Goldberg (1990) provides a detailed history presenting how
researchers have repeatedly shown the robustness of five common elements among as
many as 18,000 descriptive terms. The five elements have evolved into what is called the
big-five factors of personality or often just the big-five (John et al., 2008).

Table 3

provides a comparison of the five factors, along with common traits of those who score
low versus those with high scores across the five factors.
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Table 3: Big Five Factors of Personality (Goldberg, 1990; John and Srivastava, 1999)
Description

Low Score
Traits

High Score
Traits

an energetic and
enthusiastic approach

loner, quiet,
passive,
reserved

joiner, talkative,
assertive,
ambitious,
social,
confident

the person's level of
altruism, cooperation,
willingness to conform to
group norms, and
warmth or kindness

worried,
temperamental,
self‐conscious,
emotional

calm, even‐
tempered,
comfortable,
unemotional

the ability to control
impulses to facilitate
goal‐directed behavior

negligent, lazy,
disorganized,
late

conscientious,
hard‐working,
well‐organized,
punctual

Neuroticism

Emotional
Stability

contrast emotional
stability with feelings of
anxiety, nervousness,
and depression

suspicious,
critical,
ruthless,
irritable

trusting,
lenient, soft‐
hearted, good‐
natured

Openness

Openness to
experience,
intellect,
culture

describes the breadth of
and depth of one's life,
including the originality
and complexity of
experiences

down‐to‐earth,
uncreative,
conventional,
uncurious

imaginative,
creative,
original, curious

Dimension

Extraversion

Also Called

Surgency

Agreeableness

Conscientiousness Dependability

Due to the ubiquity of the big-five structure, it has been used across many studies
spanning decades (John et al., 2008). Even though it has been widely used, researchers
have received mixed results when trying to use one dimension as a predictor of task
performance or contextual performance (Organ, 1994; Tett et al., 1991). For example,
conscientiousness and agreeableness are two well-supported an commonly accepted
predictors of citizenship behavior (Chiaburu et al., 2011). A meta-analysis of 87 studies
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found that extroversion, emotional stability (neuroticism), and openness (intellect)
increase the predictive power of conscientiousness and agreeableness, but that they are
not the only significant standalone predictors of contextual performance (Chiaburu et al.,
2011). However, earlier studies did not find any of the factors to consistently predict
contextual behavior; rather a constellation of factors appeared to best predict contextual
behaviors (Organ, 1994). Some of the inconsistencies when using dimensions of the bigfive model may arise from the exploratory employment versus confirmatory analyses. A
meta-analysis of 97 studies found that confirmatory validities are more than twice as high
as exploratory studies (Tett et al., 1991). Despite its often futile ability to predict
behaviors via personality, the big-five provides a common framework for personality
assessments; “few theortical frameworks can compete with the impact of the five-factor
model on psychological science” (Judge et al., 2013, p. 875).
NASA-Task-load Index
Research has shown a link between performance and psychosocial variables such as
stress, personality traits, perceived workload and cognitive factors (Grasha and Schell,
2001; Rubio et al., 2004; Schell and Grasha, 2000). In addition to measures for various
psychosocial measures, some studies include the NASA-Task-load Index (NASA-TLX)
as a measure of perceived task-load (Hart and Staveland, 1988). This measure was
developed for NASA to help identify an individual’s threshold of task-saturation. The
measure assesses perceived task-load across five dimensions; it also assesses which
dimensions are identified as having the greatest impact upon task-load. The five
dimensions are summarized below in
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Table 4. The assessment is contains two parts; the first has the subject indicate how
well they believe they performed across the six dimensions in
Table 4. Next, the participants are presented with all the possible combinations of
dimension pairs and are asked which of the two dimensions was a greater determinant of
task-load for the task just completed. The pairs provide a composite score identifying
which dimensions are most influential for the participant on the given tasks (Hart,
Sandra, 2006). For example, a participant may find mental demand more influential in a
cognitive task, while finding physical demand more influential during a task involving
heavy lifting. Across multiple settings, researchers have found perceived task-load to
affect performance (Grasha and Schell, 2001; Hart, Sandra, 2006; Rubio et al., 2004;
Schell and Grasha, 2000).
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Table 4: NASA-TLX Rating Scale Definitions

An extension of job performance research considers how personality traits interact
with the subject’s perceived task-load (Chiorri et al., 2015; Grasha and Schell, 2001).
Chiorri et al. (2015) found that higher levels of extroversion were associated with higher
levels of perceived workload, while conscientiousness and emotional stability were
associated with lower levels of perceived workload. They also found that higher levels of
neuroticism were associated with higher scores on the frustration dimension; this finding
was consistent with other research (Rose et al., 2002). Conversely, another study did not
observe the same interaction of perceived workload and performance (Czaja et al., 1998).
The discrepancy may be due to the nature of the task itself (Chiorri et al., 2015);
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therefore, as more research is conducted utilizing the big-five model and NASA-TLX,
these differences should become more reliable with replication (Tett et al., 1991).
Motivation
Motivation is not the direct focus of this research, but research considering job
performance often includes motivation; motivation seems to be inherently linked to
performance (Kanfer, 1990). However, the link remains elusive from a specific model
that has provided practitioners with actionable guidance. “There remains a general lack
of understanding regarding human motivational mechanisms as they relate to operational
objectives in a variety of contexts” (Bendoly et al., 2010, p. 440). Malone and Lepper
(1987) propose seven types of motivation related to performance. One type is intrinsic
task interest; they found that when instructors (trainers or managers) vary instruction
methods for more experienced workers, their on-task effort increases (Malone and
Lepper, 1987). Managers and researchers are often seeking to increase an individual’s
motivation, and consequently improve performance (Boswell, 2000; Buller and McEvoy,
2012). One suggestion has been to enact participative goal-setting procedures (Lee et al.,
1989). The intention is that participative procedures will improve task performance by
increasing goal commitment, acceptance and difficulty (Kanfer, 1990). Line of sight
regarding how workers’ actions affect outcomes has been found to enhance performance
(Boswell, 2000; Buller and McEvoy, 2012). “All else being equal, it is clear that
information-sharing procedures that enhance an individual’s capabilities for performing a
task will enhance performance” (Kanfer, 1990, p. 112). Boudreau et al. (2003) building
upon Vroom’s classic 1964 work supports the belief that individual performance is a
multiplicative function of ability and motivation (Boudreau et al., 2003; Vroom, 1964).
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SCM Experiments
In supply chain management, human errors are often addressed tangentially with the
notable exception of the Toyota Production System (TPS) and Lean initiatives mentioned
earlier. TPS implements kanban structures, which are visual motivational elements to
enhance performance. The kanban process makes a previously arbitrary action visible
and is a constant reminder of the task at hand (Takahashi et al., 2007). Still, other aspects
of the supply chain can be affected by human errors beyond TPS and Lean process
movements (Galar et al., 2011). Thus, SCM literature has called for more studies
assessing how individuals affect supply chain performance (Ballard, 1996; Fawcett et al.,
2010); below are a couple of examples of previous SCM error-related studies.
Grasha and Schell (2001) conducted a controlled experiment and discovered how
psychosocial factors can affect error-rates in simulated prescription filling tasks. Other
research (Galar et al., 2011; Nolan, 2000; Reason, 2000) has found that standard errorrates fluctuate greatly based on a whole range of factors. The impact that specific factors
have on error-rates is more precise for some, while others are more arbitrary and used to
provide a margin of safety. For example, researchers simply doubled the expected errorrate for nuclear weapon assembly tasks completed while flying versus on the ground
(Swain, 1990). More recent research has also found that stress significantly increases the
error-rate for most individuals (Proctor and Van Zandt, 2011). The researchers designed
an experiment to induce a level of stress on particular participants by giving them less
time to complete the assigned tasks. The experiment was conducted by having
participants fill prescription orders for 80 and 90 minutes. During the exercises and
afterwards, the total errors were counted for each participant. The participants completed
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pre- and post-surveys with 15 psychosocial measures such as stress, fatigue, anxiety, etc.
They also completed the NASA-TLX to assess the level of task-saturation of each
participant. The results indicated that the individuals made errors at about the same rate
as observed in actual pharmacies. They also identified psychosocial measures that
significantly correlated with an increased number of individual errors. Of note, is that
they confirmed a higher error-rate for the participants in the groups with higher induced
stress. The participants who had higher levels of steady-state stress identified in the pretest also had higher error-rates. However, they did not test any methods for reducing the
number of errors committed.
In another study (Weaver et al., 2010), the researchers assessed order-picking times
when the method of pick-list was varied. Participants fulfilled orders using traditional
text-based lists, graphical paper lists, audio queues, or a heads-up monocle device. The
primary variable of interest was order-picking times, but the researchers did count the
errors committed by each participant. They found that the heads-up display was the
method that enabled the fastest and most accurate order picking by the participants.
However, they did not measure correlations of individual differences. They also
acknowledge the impracticality of implementing robust human-computer interaction
devices at the current state of technology. Such a change would be expensive and
cumbersome (Weaver et al., 2010); consequently, the need remains for further research
into cost effective methods to reduce errors in the SC.
Summary
This research has presented literature to show how fewer errors can lead to increased
task performance, increased firm performance, increased SCM performance.
70

Specifically, as individual task and contextual learning occurs, it enables organizational
learning to occur; thereby improving supply accuracy. Superior skills and resources,
taken together, represent the ability of a firm to surpass its competitors in the marketplace
(Day and Wensley, 1988). This macro level improvement is made possible by improving
the micro level components. This research propositions that mission understanding or
mission clarity is a fertile area for assessment, because it relates to an individual’s
understanding of how their actions impact the macro system.
Some researchers have proposed concepts similar to mission clarity, but with
different nuances. One example is workplace awareness (Gutwin et al., 1996).
Workplace awareness is primarily associated with advances in telecommuting and
organizations seeking to maintain group awareness of collaborative projects.
Additionally, in a recent commentary prefacing a social work journal, the editor calls for
social workers to increase their organizational awareness (Silverman, 2015). The editor
does not present organizational awareness as a construct, but calls for broader
understanding of connections between macro and micro components of social work. In
another commentary, John Beck encourages practitioners to have a better understanding
of the multi-faceted challenges facing healthcare organizations (such as reimbursements,
rising administrative costs, risk, accounts receivables, etc.). Beck states that improved
organizational awareness will improve leadership’s ability to attain strategic and tactical
goals via continuous improvement (Beck, 2015). Beck is addressing organizational
leaders and calling for specific healthcare questions to be answered by the academic
community. Finally, in an editorial assessing the impact of BOM upon various fields, the
authors request researchers seek specific elements that further the understanding of how
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individuals impact organizational performance (Croson et al., 2013). The authors
conduct a review of trends and developing topics in operations management. They find
an increase in the acceptance of an individual’s response as opposed to looking at only
the aggregate responses. They also call for better connections of micro-level findings to
macro-level implications. Much of the above literature review has identified theories and
research specific to the micro-level; e.g. worker training, education, learning, task
performance, motivation, etc. Theories of the firm and organizational learning are
examples of macro-level views; however, they are less abundant. Even more sparse, are
studies that directly seek to connect the two (Sawhney, 2013). Therefore, this researcher
proposes mission clarity as a construct to connect micro and macro perspectives of
performance; mission clarity is an individual’s understanding of why and where they fit
into the larger system; it is comprised of their mission related education, experiences and
individual characteristics.
Problem Statement
This research integrates the current needs of supply chain management regarding
human errors in the order picking and packing process with principles from human
factors engineering, inventory management, and psychology. Human factors research
has provided a strong framework for analyzing tasks at a very detailed level to provide
insight into how errors affect the larger desired outcome (Reason, 2000); one such
framework is Activity Theory. Activity Theory is frequently employed when researchers
are looking for insight into how an individuals’ task completion is affected by all
elements in the setting, including cultural, psychosocial, environmental, and
organizational factors (Kuutti, 1996). In particular, recent Activity Theory applications
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have focused on how workers interact with computer systems (Bedny and Karwowski,
2003; Engestrom, 2000). The research provides support for considering numerous
factors when assessing the probability of an operator making an error during an activity.
Models based upon Activity Theory often carefully consider factors other theories treat as
peripheral to the activity. For example, Activity Theory would consider a person’s
culture, humidity, lighting, etc. Bedny and Karwowski, looked at the warehouse
operations of “picking and packing” orders via Activity Theory (Bedny and Karwowski,
2003). They recorded the probability of error based upon how often workers failed to
complete a task in an acceptable manner. The original efforts up through the work by
Bendy and Karwowski confirm that if a final error-rate is desired, managers can look at
sub-tasks to find where improvements will have the most impact on overall performance
(Bedny and Karwowski, 2003). They also concluded, similar to Leveson, that human
operations are becoming increasingly intertwined with computer systems (Leveson,
2011). Considering the above research and observed opportunities, it is proposed that
supply chain workers make observable, preventable errors while completing their
assigned tasks in the shipping process.
Research Questions
A quote by Baron von Steuben succinctly captures the essence of this research.
Baron von Steuben was a Prussian officer in George Washington’s Continental Army.
He was responsible for training and discipline of recruits. In his memoirs he records
“You can tell Prussian, German, French soldiers to do this and he does it; with the
Americans I am obliged to say ‘this is why you do it; then he will do it” (Lockhart, 2008).
The concept is that, at least in American culture, performance may be affected by an
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individual’s knowledge of why and where they fit into a larger system, called mission
clarity. Thus, the overall research question is: What is the relationship of mission clarity
to job performance?
This research combines education, experience and subject characteristics as factors
that constitute mission clarity. As can be seen in Figure 12, this research includes task
performance, perceived task-load, and contextual performance elements of job
performance. The solid lines connecting mission clarity factors to job performance
factors indicate a direct relationship, while the dashed lines indicate an interaction effect.
This will expand the investigative questions into twelve specific hypotheses, presented
below. The subject characteristics of interest relate to mission clarity such previous
careers, years of experience, depot tours, deployments, specialty courses. It is important
to consider subject characteristics because previous research suggests that a decision
maker’s experience with solving a particular type of problem, can impact their future
performance (Mennecke et al., 2000). Moreover, other items that comprise subject
characteristics are likely to vary across a wide spectrum for workers.

Figure 12: Proposed Research Model
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Hypotheses
Task performance is enhanced by education, experience and subject characteristics.
Although learning is not directly observable, researchers are able to infer learning form
measureable performance behaviors. Education has been found to be a vital element for
improving performance, and experience is a catalyst for making education efficacious.
Nonetheless, education and experience affect individuals differently, partly due to preexisting levels of education and experiences, called subject characteristics. Therefore,
there seems to be an interaction between increased education, experience, and subject
characteristics in relation to increased performance, reference hypothesis 1 below.
•

H.1: There is a positive relationship between task performance and:
•

H.1.a: more education.

•

H.1.b: more experience.

•

H.1.c: education* experience.

•

H.1.d: subject characteristics.

•
Education, experience and subject characteristics also influence the perception of task
load. Every individual has a point at which they become task saturated, when adding
another task would degrade their cumulative performance. If hypothesis 1 holds true,
then it is a possible consequence that individuals would change their perception of the
existing task load, reference hypothesis 2. They may have a better understanding of the
task and view it as worthy of more attention, thus increasing their perceived task load, or
they may gain confidence in the task to the point that it requires less attention, thus
lowering their perceived task load.
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•

H.2: There is a significant relationship between perceived task-load and:
•

H.2.a: more education.

•

H.2.b: more experience.

•

H.2.c: education* experience.

•

H.2.d: subject characteristics.

Contextual performance, also called organizational citizenship behavior, is enhanced
by education, experience and subject characteristics. There is an established link between
increased task performance and improved contextual performance. However, the
direction, strength and antecedents involved are not settled. This research is uniquely
structured to assess the impact of education, experience, and subject characteristics upon
contextual performance in order to elucidate the relationships, reference hypothesis 3.
For example, individuals with more education and experience may be organizational
experts able to interact more comfortably with other employees.
•

H.3: There is a significant relationship between organizational citizenship
behavior and:
•

H.3.a: more education.

•

H.3.b: more experience.

•

H.3.c: education* experience.

•

H.3.d: subject characteristics.
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III. Methodology
Introduction
Logistics and supply chain management (SCM) are diverse fields encompassing
numerous business activities; Stock and Boyer (2009) highlight the diversity of the field
by analyzing 166 definitions of SCM. A critical component of many SCM activities is
the individual. However, the individual’s behavior is often treated as rational and not
studied for its impact upon the supply chain (SC) (Williams and Tokar, 2008).
“Behavioral experiments represent a potentially valuable and currently underutilized
approach for gaining insight into logistics and supply chain decision making that is
commonly characterized by departures from rational thought” (Michael Knemeyer and
Naylor, 2011, p. 296). Controlled experiments are by no means new to related disciplines
such as economics, psychology and sociology; yet, they are a recent development in
SCM (Tokar, 2010). Many researchers and journal editors have called for more research
focusing on the human contribution to SC performance (Fawcett et al., 2008, 2011;
Mentzer and Flint, 1997; Näslund, 2002). While there is a need for behavioral
experiments to help address important SCM problems, not all research is well fitted for
an experiment (Tokar, 2010). For behavioral research to yield meaningful results, it must
be both well-fitting for the phenomenon and carefully conducted (Michael Knemeyer and
Naylor, 2011). As discussed in the literature review above, human errors are well fitting
for behavioral experiments. Therefore, this research will conduct a behavioral-based
controlled experiment to determine the effect of education and experience on job
performance in an Air Force pick and pack operation.
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Interviews
Before developing the experiment, this researcher began by conducting 16 informal
interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) including Air Force officers, senior
enlisted members, junior enlisted members, and civilian logisticians. These interviews
were not formalized and most were conversational in format. The conversationalinterviews were conducted from the fall of 2014 to the fall of 2015. The purpose was to
determine how pick and pack operations are conducted and what factors they believe may
affect worker performance. Additionally, this researcher toured two large distribution
centers (one for a global retailer, one for a regional food distribution company) and two
Air Force supply warehouses to discuss the organizations’ pick and pack operations. Due
to the varied opportunities to interact with SMEs during tours, phone calls and email
correspondences, the interviews varied in format. The results from the interviews were
not formalized and the collection was not standardized across SMEs. However, to gain a
perspective of the organization’s pick and pack operations, this researcher would ask the
SMEs many of the following questions:
•

Senior SMEs
•

How much training do workers receive before they are considered “ready”
for their tasks?

•

What novel experiences relating to organizational scope (tours, visiting
customers, job exchanges, etc.) are available?
•

Are the opportunities formalized or ad hoc?

•

What do you see as the result of these experiences?

•

What have you seen that affects supply workers’ performance?

•

What steps are in place to catch and correct order errors?

•

Do you track error-rates? If so, how?
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•

Junior SMEs
•

How much training did you receive before being expected to know your
job?

•

Did you feel like the training quantity or duration was correct?

•

What opportunities do you have to see more of the organization’s
operations (tours, visiting customers, job exchanges, etc.)?

•

•

Have you done any of these items?

•

What are your thoughts of these experiences, did they help you
understand what your organization does?

•

Which experiences helped you to understand your job’s
importance?

What checks are in place in case you make a mistake?

The SMEs’ comments were compiled to create common elements affecting pick and
pack performance. For example, SMEs uniformly stressed the importance of stocking the
pick and pack area accurately. If a worker places an incorrect bin in the pick and pack
area, the error can propagate through many orders before found. Similarly, the SMEs
identified the importance of inventory record accuracy throughout the warehouse in order
to conduct a successful pick and pack operation. Another item of concern related to the
unit of issue for the order. Some items are packaged and issued together, whereas others
are issued individually. For example shoes come in pairs, pencils may come in packages
with a quantity of ten, and batteries may be issued as each.
Based on the SMEs input, this researcher developed a small preliminary experiment
using six volunteer master and doctoral students. The experiment was used to refine the
proposed methodology. For example, during the preliminary experiment, some
participants were allowed to fill the orders with no time limit to determine about how
long each order would take to complete. One participant said, “This is not like regular
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picking; I would never have as much time as I wanted to fill an order. We are always
rushed to get everything done.” This anecdotal statement supported the literature, that
most picking operations are rushed activities (De Koster et al., 2007). During the timed
trials, no participants were able to complete all the orders. In the trials without a time
limit, the participants still made errors. Next, this researcher conducted the primary
experiment based on the culmination of the literature, interviews, preliminary
experiment.
Primary Experiment
This study utilized 103 active duty enlisted Air Force supply workers from one
Supply Squadron and two Air Force Supply Chain Operations Groups (SCOG). The
study utilized this sample population because it is the largest concentration of Air Force
supply workers in the Air Force. The Supply Squadron and one SCOG were located at
Langley Air Force Base (AFB); the other SCOG was at Scott AFB. The experiment was
offered to the first 6 enlisted grades (E-1 through E-6). However, none of the participants
were E-1s, see Figure 13. The majority of subjects were E-4s and were normally
distributed among E-2 to E-6 participants. The participants reported age on a 7-point
Likert scale; the majority of participants were 24-26 years old and skewed towards
younger participants, see Figure 14. Finally, as an incentive, the participants at both
locations were entered into a drawing for a one-day pass. This military incentive was
given by the commander and entitled the recipient(s) to one day of excused absence from
work.
The sample is representative of the target population across demographic assessments
performed. Four of the 12 demographic measurements were compared to known Air
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Force supply workers population values. These population data are collected and
maintained by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC). AFPC publishes the data via a
searchable web-based utility. However, eight demographic items were collected to
explore demographic traits associated with experiences that theory suggested may
influence performance. These items were tested to ensure random assignments were not
biased among the groups. The exploratory items were not significantly more present in
any one group.

Figure 13: Enlisted Grade Distribution

Three subjects were excluded. The first subject was excluded because the subject
was on crutches, although the subject was able to hobble through the experiment without
his crutches, he was not considered to be a representative sample of the normal
population. The second subject was excluded due to an incomplete experiment. This
subject seemed disorientated and was the only subject to not complete the computerbased inventories necessary for including the subjects’ scores. The third subject was
excluded due to errors in administering the experiment. Subjects were allowed to ask
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questions throughout the experiment, and they were given standard responses to the
extent possible. For example, if the participant asked if it was okay to perform the task in
a certain way, they were told to use their discretion. However, if they explicitly asked a
direct question, they were given a direct answer. Refer to the statements below as
examples.
•

Excerpt of direction given: “Once you have made the shipping label, place
it in the plastic tub. Then, use the picklist to select the items needed to fill
the order and place them in the tub with the corresponding label.”

•

Participant A question: “Can I put the label in the tub now?”

•

Researcher’s response: “It is up to you.”

•

Participant B question: “I forgot, what did you say we were supposed to
do with the labels once they are printed?”

•

Researcher’s response: “The labels are to be placed in the plastic tubs
corresponding to each order.”

The third excluded subject asked a question differently than other subjects. This
researcher tried to respond in such a way as to allow her freedom to make a decision
about the tasks without unfairly giving her more guidance than other subjects. See the
conversation below; it occurred about a third of the way through the primary task.
•

Participant: “So, I want to make sure I am doing this correctly. This
column [pointing to the picklist] refers to the item, this column is the
quantity needed for the order, and this is the unit of issue.”

•

She was correct; the researcher responded with a nod and said, “That is
correct.”

•

She then asked: “So I am picking the quantity [pointing] for the order;
what’s the unit of issue mean?”

•

Researcher’s response: “The unit of issue is a designation that indicates
the count, measurement, or form of the item ordered. It will let you know
if the item has multiple items, for example, in a package, or if each item
counts as an ordered item.”

•

Participant: “Oh, okay; thanks.”
82

The researcher’s response mirrored the AFH 23-123v2pt1 description of unit of issue.
Instead of clarifying the worker’s actions, the response actually confused her. Prior to
asking the question, she was picking each line item correctly. Afterwards, she switched
and picked only one item for each line item, based on the unit of issue instead of the
needed quantity. Therefore, this case was removed due to receiving unclear guidance
causing her misunderstand the tasks. After removing these three cases, the number of
included cases was 100.

Figure 14: Participant Age Distribution

Treatments
Regardless of group, all participants received the same initial training for the
experiment tasks. This researcher selected three predictors for job performance as
components of an individual’s mission clarity. This research defines mission clarity as an
individual’s knowledge of why and where they fit into a larger system; comprised of
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education, experience and subject characteristics. There are many ways organizations
can choose to educate their workers (Schunk, 2011). Based on SME input and current
Air Force methods of education (USAF, 2014), this study operationalized the education
treatment using traditional education methods. Specifically, the subjects received a
verbal explanation of the items’ use via a 1-minute computer-based presentation. The
participants heard a recorded narrative while viewing a PowerPoint presentation with a
building slide, see Appendix B.
Literature has shown that experience is an integral part of learning (Argote and
Miron-Spektor, 2011). However, the literature is focused on experience related directly
to the task (Crick et al., 2013). Our hypothesis expands the current perception of
experience to include experiences not directly related to the tasks. Rather, the experience
is designed to provide perspective to the overall mission; the intent is to provide the
participant with greater context as to why they are completing a task. Therefore,
experience was operationalized as a novel experience related to the mission, but not
necessarily to the tasks. Subjects met an end user of the supplies who has flown medical
evacuation missions. The confederate was a pilot and fellow student who volunteered to
support this research. He was an active duty Air Force lieutenant colonel C-130 and KC135 pilot. He met with participants for about 6 minutes and relayed two war stories. The
interaction with the confederate was the experience treatment. The confederate told the
same stories to all participants; however, they were delivered in-person in a
conversational format. The confederate stated the importance of carrying the needed
medical items and the necessity to not carry too many items due to lower flying-altitudes
and higher fuel consumption rates. Subject characteristics is the third component
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affecting mission clarity. Participants completed the Big Five Inventory (BFI)
personality assessment (John and Srivastava, 1999; John et al., 2008) The BFI has been
widely used to assess individuals personality tendencies for job screening, performance
prediction and correlations to other phenomena (Fossati et al., 2011; Goldberg, 1990;
O’Connor and Cohn, 2009). O’Connor and Cohn (2009) found that the BFI has
predictive value, especially the subcomponents of conscientiousness and neuroticism in
relation to aviator performance.
Performance Measures
Job performance was measured using three primary measures: task performance,
perceived task-load, and contextual performance. A score of performance, instead of
using raw error scores, was chosen to accurately capture picking and packing taskperformance. As can be seen in Equation 1, the denominator includes the percent
complete added to the percent of time remaining. The numerator includes the errors
committed and a constant of one. The constant is necessary to accurately compare two
individuals who commit no errors but have different percent complete and percent of
time remaining values; otherwise both individuals would have a score of zero.

1
%

%

Equation 1: Performance Response Variable Formulation

Consider the five notional subjects presented in Table 5. Imagine that subjects 1-3
committed ten errors each; if we only compared errors, they would all receive the same
score even though they performed the assigned task to a different level of completion.
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Once percent complete and time remaining are considered, we can see their relative
performance. The comparison of the five notional subjects also shows how lower
response scores indicate better task performance. Each subject utilized the full amount of
time unless they completed all picks. Therefore, if a subject completed the task with no
errors and did not finish early, their score would be one as can be seen with Subject 4 in
Table 5. If the subject is able to complete the entire task with no errors and time
remaining, their score would be less than one as can be seen with Subject 5 in Table 5. If
a subject makes one or more error, their score will be greater than one as can be seen in
Subjects 1, 2, and 3.

Table 5: Comparison of Performance Variable
Errors

% lines
% time
complete remaining

Formulation

Yperformance

Participant 1

10

100%

50%

10 1
1 .5

7.33

Participant 2

10

100%

0%

10 1
1 0

11

Participant 3

10

50%

0%

10
.5

1
0

22

Participant 4

0

100%

50%

0
1

1
.5

0.67

Participant 5

0

100%

0%

0
1

1
0

1

To measure task errors, the study used a paper-based error tally sheet, see Appendix
C. The tally sheet could capture task duration, skill-based errors, rule-based errors,
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knowledge based error, and notes. Additionally, it could track other items of interest for
future studies, such as how many questions the subjects asked throughout the experiment.
Perceived task-load was measured with the NASA-TLX (Hart and Staveland, 1988)
and by counting the number of completed lines. The 20-item version of the
Organizational Citizenship Behavior Checklist (Fox et al., 2012), was used to measure
contextual performance (Organ, 1997; Smith et al., 1983). The above predictors and
performance measures comprise the elements needed to answer the research hypotheses
and are depicted in Figure 15. The solid lines connecting the mission clarity factors
indicate a proposed direct relationship, while the dashed lines indicate an interaction
effect between education and experience upon job performance.

Figure 15: Research Model
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Procedure
The following experiment received internal review board (IRB) exemption approval
(Appendix D). The experiment was conducted over the course of four weeks at Langley
AFB and 1 week at Scott AFB, to include 74 trials at Langley AFB and 28 trials at Scott
AFB (the three excluded subjects occurred at Scott AFB). The subjects volunteered to
participate in the experiment after being notified via a standardized email briefly
describing the study; the email was written by the researcher and sent via their
organization’s leadership. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four groups to
conduct a mixed-design experiment; the design included a 2 x 2 factorial component and
a within-subject baseline component (Van Breukelen, 2006). The first factor was
education with the two levels being education treatment and no education treatment. The
second factor was experience, also with two levels of experience treatment and no
experience treatment, see Table 6. The control group received no education treatment
and no experience treatment. The group identified as Edu received only the education
treatment. The group identified as Exp only received the experience treatment and the
group identified as Edu & Exp received both the education and experience treatments.
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Table 6: 2x2 Factorial Design
All
Participants
trained

No Experience

Experience

No
Education

1: Control
n=27

2: Exp
n=24

Education

3: Edu
n=25

4: Edu & Exp
n=24

The experimental design included a mix of within-subject components and betweensubject comparisons. However, to understand the phenomenon and properly account for
individual differences, the study also conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).
This method allows the baseline residuals to be used as a covariate in the model
containing the treatments (Van Breukelen, 2006). The covariate accounts for the
individual differences inherent to each subject. Some people are more error prone than
others (Reason, 1990). The covariate captures the individuals’ differences in
performance from the mean. Therefore, if an individual scores much lower than the
mean, we would expect them score much lower in subsequent assessments; that is, it
provides a baseline of performance for an individual.
The participants signed up for time slots of 90 minutes starting at 0700, running
through 1700. We utilized three primary areas for the experiment. The first was a
welcoming area that consisted of two chairs and a table. For all participants, the
experiment started by welcoming the volunteer, providing necessary disclosure and
consent forms, instructions, and answering any questions. The task was thoroughly
explained and participants could ask questions throughout; participants were shown an
89

example pick list and label. After the introductory phase, which lasted about 8 minutes,
the participants were led to the task area, which contained a mock supply area.
The task area consisted of two supply racks with a total of 60 positions filled with
varied items used for fulfilling the mock orders. To match inventory management
literature, the supply area contained about 5% erroneous stock. The error types were held
constant for all participants. For example, participants needed to pick 3 bandages with 2
safety pins. The bandages were in small bags in the bin. The bin contained 5 bags; only
three contained two safety pins. The two bags without the safety pins were always placed
on top of the three correct bags. Therefore, participants who did not check the bags
would grab the incorrect bags. The task also contained two serialized items. The items
were placed so that if they grabbed the first two, the first would be correct and the second
would have the wrong serial number. To pick the serialized items correctly, the
participants had to verify the pick list notes and the physical item. The varied
possibilities of errors enabled me to divide the errors into generic error modeling system
(GEMS) model using the skill, rule, knowledge (S-R-K) structure (Embrey and Lane,
1990; Reason, 2000). The task area also contained the label maker and large plastic tubs
for filling each order. The participants could see a tablet with a timer showing the
remaining time for the given task. The third area was a separate cubicle area with a
laptop used to complete the post-experiment measures.
To account for individual differences associated with picking performance, a baseline
was established for each individual, see Table 7. The participant was directed to
complete a shipping label then fill one order based on a laminated pick list that contained
all needed information for the label and picking 16 line items, see Appendix E.
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Participants were timed during the label making process, but there was no time limit and
the tablet-timer was not active. After they completed the label and indicated they were
ready to begin picking, they were instructed to begin and 5-minute timer was started.
Once they completed the order or exhausted the available time, they stopped and the
researcher set the order (plastic tub) to the side. Next, the treatment was administered.
The control group participants began the second task without any treatment. Participants
in the education only treatment group were shown the pre-recorded PowerPoint
presentation on a laptop in the experiment area. Participants in the experience only group
were escorted a short distance to a neighboring cubicle area to meet the confederate.
Participants receiving both treatments were first shown the presentation in the experiment
area and then escorted to the experience area. These two operationalizations of education
and experience are consistent with Kolb and Kolb’s experience-based learning theory
(Kolb and Kolb, 2005).

Table 7: Establishing Participant Baseline
All Participants will
be trained

1st Run

2nd Run

<8 min

<24 minutes

1: Control

baseline

Control

2: Education

baseline

Ed

3: Experience

baseline

Exp

4: Edu & Exp

baseline

Edu & Exp
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After the treatment was administered, participants returned to the experiment area for
the second task. They were given a laminated sheet with three separate orders, see
Appendix F. Each order required an associated shipping label, contained 16 line items,
and utilized a separate plastic tub. The participants were directed to complete the labels
for all three orders before picking any of the items for an order. This was a logistical
accommodation because there was no time limit for making the labels, but matches some
operation warehouses that will print picking lists and shipping labels in batches. After
participants completed the shipping labels, they began picking the orders. They were
instructed to pick the first order before moving to the second. Each order contained 16
line-items varying from two to twenty-three items needed to fill the order. The orders
were balanced so that they would not be too large to fit into the provided plastic tubs.
Once the participants completed the orders or exhausted the 15-minute timer, they were
told, “Good job.”
Lastly, they were escorted to the other cubicle area to complete the computer-based
inventories. This was the same location as the experience treatment area, where they met
the confederate, but he was not in the area while they completed the computer-based
inventories. Using a laptop, participants completed the NASA-TLX, Big-Five Inventory,
Organizational Citizenship Behavior Inventory, mission knowledge assessment and
demographic questionnaire. The NASA-TLX was completed online, with a stand-alone
version as a backup. Even with the backup version, the data transfer from the online
assessment was not seamless; nine participants’ data were not saved. The remaining
items were completed using Google Forms; all but one participant successfully
completed and saved the data using Google Forms. Once the participants completed the
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computer-based inventories, they were thanked again and instructed them to sign-up for
the one-day pass drawing. The total experiment duration averaged 67 minutes with
standard deviation of 14 minutes and 45 seconds. After a participant left the experiment
area, the task was reset for the next participant.
While the participants were completing the task, they were watched and the
researcher recorded specific behaviors on an assessment sheet; the sheet is provided in
Appendix B. The assessment sheet was also used to make notes specific to a participant,
including relevant comments that provided qualitative context to the experiment. After
the participants left the experiment area, the assessment sheet was used to record any
errors with the orders. The same procedure was used to count errors and reset the
experiment for each participant. All items were double counted as they were returned to
the bins; all deviations were annotated. After all errors were tabulated, the task area was
straightened and readied for the next participant. All data was transcribed into Excel.
Data entry was verified using formulas to check for errors and anomalies. Additionally,
10% of the entries were re-entered to assess the accuracy of the data. When compared,
the data entry was found to be accurate, although the process did reveal an incorrect
formula. Finally, the data of interest to the quantitative analysis were imported in the JMP
Statistical software for analysis (“JMP®”, n.d.). The following analysis uses a statistical
significance of .05 throughout.
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IV. Results
Manipulation Check
A manipulation check was conducted for the education treatment to determine if the
treatment worked as intended. Participants completed eight questions regarding the
information presented in the educational treatment; the questions are listed in
Table 8. However, question #6 was rejected due to poor wording. The question asks,
“How many line-items did you pack during the task?” The confusion arose from whether
the participants were putting the number of items they were supposed to pick or the
number they actually picked; that is, did they remember that each order contained 16
items. Additionally, participants could have included the pretest line items along with the
task items. Therefore, the question was not included in the analysis. The inter-item
reliability was calculated using JMP and reported as a Cronbach’s alpha (“JMP®”, n.d.).
The Cronbach alpha score for the measurement was .65. Ideally, a higher score would be
preferred. However, the lower value is not uncommon in first measurements associated
with intelligence measures (Loewenthal, 2001a).

Table 8: Mission Knowledge Questions
Mission Knowledge
1
Mission Knowledge
2
Mission Knowledge
3
Mission Knowledge
4
Mission Knowledge
5

What types of items were primarily shipped during the task?
Who was the intended recipient of the orders filled during your task?
Where did the items come from that were shipped?
Who will be delivering the items?
According to the task description, how often does the Air Force send
routing shipments like the ones you filled during the task?
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Mission Knowledge
6
Mission Knowledge
7
Mission Knowledge
8

How many line-items did you pack during the task? (Not included in
analysis.)
To how many countries were the orders sent?
What country was on at least one of the orders?

The manipulation check indicates that the treatment worked as expected. As can be
seen in Table 9, the ANOVA between the treatment groups (including the control) shows
that one of them is significantly different from another treatment group (F=3.19, p=.03).
Further analysis using Tukey-Kramer honestly significant differences (HSD) showed the
ordered differences and revealed that the experience and education group scored
significantly higher than the control and experience group. However, the experience and
education group did not score significantly higher than the education group, as can be
seen in
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Table 10. Additionally, a least squares analysis of the treatment effect that isolates
the effect of each treatment reveals that it is education that is significantly affecting the
change in mission knowledge scores (F=6.76,

p=0.01), as can be seen in Table 11.

These findings verify that participants who received the education treatment did, in fact,
represent a new population, representative of increased knowledge regarding the task.

Table 9: Manipulation Check ANOVA
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

3.00
95.00
98.00

Sum of
Squares
0.18
1.79
1.97
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Mean
Square
0.06
0.02

F Ratio

Prob > F

3.19

0.03

Table 10: Tukey-Kramer HSD Ordered Differences
Level of Comparison
Exp & Edu
Exp & Edu
Exp & Edu
Edu
Edu
Exp

Control
Exp
Edu
Control
Exp
Control

Difference
0.11
0.10
0.06
0.04
0.04
0.00

Std Err
Diff
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04

Lower
CL
0.03
0.02
‐0.01
‐0.03
‐0.04
‐0.07

Upper
CL
0.18
0.18
0.14
0.12
0.12
0.08

p‐Value
0.01
0.01
0.10
0.28
0.33
0.93

Table 11: Manipulation Check Least Squares by Treatment Effect
Source
Education
Experience
Education*Experience

Sum of
Squares
0.13
0.03
0.02

F Ratio

Prob > F

6.76
1.51
1.23

0.01
0.22
0.27

Models
Each major hypothesis is comprised of four components; to assess the twelve
hypotheses, this research includes 6 models shown in Table 12. The results of the models
and hypotheses are presented first; then, post-hoc analyses are discussed. Model 1 and 4
were formulated to test hypotheses with task performance as the response variable. As an
ANCOVA analysis, Model 1 included the baseline performance residuals as a covariate.
The covariate accounts for the individual differences inherent to each subject and
captures the individuals’ differences in performance from the mean. Therefore, if an
individual scores much lower than the mean, we would expect them score much lower in
subsequent assessments; that is, it provides a baseline of performance for an individual.
Models 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are testing subject characteristics not manipulated by treatment
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and do not include the baseline residuals as a covariate. The interaction variable was
included in Models 1, 2, and 3 based on the literature showing the interconnectedness of
education and experience (Dewey, 1938; Schunk, 2011). The models are discussed in
greater detail, individually, below.

Table 12: Research Models and Associated Hypotheses
Model
Identifier
M1

M2

M3

Hypotheses
Tested
H.1.a
H.1.b
H.1.c
H.2.a
H.2.b
H.2.c
H.3.a
H.3.b
H.3.c

M4

H.1.d

M5

H.2.d

M6

H.3.d

Model
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Model Assumptions
To meet the required assumption of normality, the residuals should not be distributed
significantly different than the normal distribution. This can be assessed visually and via
statistical tests; both were performed upon the data. Normality was assessed visually by
looking at the normal quantile plot of residuals against predicted residuals. The residuals
of the baseline treatments showed significant deviations from normality, as can be seen
where the values exceed the normal threshold (indicated by red dashed lines in Figure
16). This was expected due to the fact that the job performance measures have a fixed
level for maximum performance, but allow individuals to make virtually any number of
errors. Similarly, participants can only work so fasts, but can vary greatly in how slow
they can perform.

Figure 16: Residual Normal Quantile Plot
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The response variable was transformed exponentially using a log transformation.
This transformation resulted in residuals that were normally distributed as can be seen in
Figure 17. This figure shows that the values fall much closer to the expected values (the
straight red line). The distribution follows the normal distribution much more closely, as
indicated by comparing the green histogram bars. Additionally, the Shapiro-Wilks test
was also used to test the residuals from the transformed variable for normality. Given
that p = .45 was greater than .05, we did not reject the null hypothesis that normality was
violated and accepted the distribution as normal.

Figure 17: Transformed Residual Normal Quantile Plot
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This analysis also considered the impact of time-of-day upon the variance of the
response variable scores. As can be seen in Figure 18, the scores show reasonable
homoscedasticity. When the variance across predictors for the baseline scores are
compared, they did not show significant heteroscedasticity, see Table 13. The O’Brien
and Brown-Forsythe tests were used and supported the assumption of homoscedasticity.
The same tests were also completed upon the predictors and the treatment performance
scores. While the test are not significant at the .05 level, they are close with p=.06. Given
that they were so close, further investigation was completed and is discussed further in
the post-hoc analysis section.

Figure 18: Time of Day Variance
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Table 13: Tests of Constant Variance
Treatment
Level
Control
Edu
Exp
Exp & Edu

Count

Std
Dev

Mean
AbsDif
to Mean

Mean
AbsDif
to Median

27

14.15

11.16

8.72

25

14.26

8.94

8.22

24

4.37

3.62

3.61

24

4.32

3.59

3.59

27

6.49

4.79

25

4.53

24
24

F
Ratio

DF
Num

DF
Den

Prob
>F

O'Brien
[.5]

1.83

3

96

0.15

BrownForsythe

0.65

3

96

0.59

3.64

O'Brien
[.5]

2.49

3

96

0.06

3.83

3.43

BrownForsythe

2.49

3

96

0.06

4.95

3.69

3.43

3.03

2.25

2.17

Test

Baseline
Level
Control
Edu
Exp

Exp &
Edu

Baseline Performance
To analyze the complex dataset, the researcher began by looking at the baseline
performance of the four groups (lower performance scores indicate fewer errors and more
desired performance). The experimental design should have resulted in baseline groups
that were representative of the target population; therefore, one would expect the groups
to not vary significantly. The groups did not exhibit significantly different levels of
performance p=.56; consequently it is concluded that participants were adequately
random samples from the target population. Figure 19 shows a visual comparison of the
mean performance score of the four treatment groups.
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Even though the treatment group means were not significantly different, the
participants exhibited expected variances in performance; some people were more errorprone than others. This variance is attributed to unexplained individual differences.
Looking forward to scores after receiving the treatment, the individual scores will contain
the main effect from the treatment, error related to the treatment condition and error due
to the individual’s abilities. To eliminate the error associated with individual
performance, this analysis used the baseline residuals from the baseline performance as a
covariate in the model containing the treatments. This analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) allowed for the baseline performance results to account for a portion of the
unexplained variance between individuals. The baseline covariate is included in the
models related to performance, education and experience (H.1.a, H.1.b, H.1.c, and H.1.d).
The other two response variables (perceived task-load (NASA-TLX) and organizational
citizenship behavior (OCB)), were only measured once at the conclusion of the primary
tasks. Therefore, they do not include the performance baseline covariate and the analysis
of variance (ANOVA) methodology is used.
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Figure 19: Baseline Groups’ Performance Means

Overall Group Differences
An individual’s performance was measured using three primary measures: task
performance, perceived task-load, and contextual performance. A score of performance,
instead of using raw error scores, was chosen to accurately capture picking and packing
task-performance. As can be seen in Equation 1, the denominator includes the percent
complete added to the percent of time remaining. The numerator includes the errors
committed and a constant of one. The constant is necessary to accurately compare two
individuals who commit no errors but have different percent complete and percent of
time remaining values; otherwise both individuals would have a score of zero. More
errors will lead to a larger numerator while greater task completion and more time
remaining will result in a larger denominator; thus, lower scores indicate better
performance.
104

Initial analyses showed that the four groups’ performance means were not
significantly different at baseline, see Figure 19. Next, it was found that at least one of
the performance means from the treatment groups was significantly different from
another, p=.02, see Table 14. Figure 20 shows the group means with standard error bars.
Not only are the means significantly lower in groups that received the experience
treatment, they also have reduced variability. The differences of variability are
emphasized in Figure 21. This figure shows a graphical representation of the response
concentrations. The shapes indicate that the majority of scores are centered with
performance scores clustered around a score of 10. The control and education groups
have a few scores with very high scores indicating more errors and degraded
performance. Those who received the experience treatment did not commit the gross
rule-based errors committed by the control and education only groups.

Figure 20: Treatment Group Means with Standard Error Bars
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Table 14: Initial ANOVA of Treatment Groups
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

3.00
96.00
99.00

Sum of
Squares
1147.49
10951.84
12099.33

Mean
Square
382.50
114.08

F Ratio

Prob > F

3.35

0.02

Figure 21: Treatment Group Response Concentrations

Model 1: H.1.a, H.1.b, and H.1.c
1:
Equation 2: Model 1 for H.1.a, H.1.b, and H.1.c
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Model 1 was formulated to test Hypothesis H.1.a, H.1.b and H.1.c. H.1.c was
conducted first to assess the interaction of education and experience; it is shown in Figure
22. The results show that there is an interaction between education and experience.
However, this interaction was not found to be significant (F = 0.24 p = 0.62), see Table
16. Nonetheless, the interaction is present and means that education and experience
cannot be analyzed in isolation without accounting for this interaction. In the models are
presented below, comparisons are made using the leverage plots in the JMP software
package. The leverage plots compare the residuals from the included predictors to assess
the influence exerted upon the variable of interest (“JMP®”, n.d.). The comparison
allows us to understand the influence of education from the two groups that received an
education treatment versus those that did not, labeled control. The two groups that did
not receive the education treatment were the control group and the experience only group.
Similarly, it also allows us to see the influence of experience in the two groups that
received and experience treatment versus the control of those that did not receive
experience, that is, those in the control group and education only group.
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Control

Treatment

Figure 22: Education and Experience Interaction Performance Effect

Model 1 also includes H.1.a and H.1.b, both of which have performance as the
response variable. As an ANCOVA analysis, it includes the baseline performance
residuals. It also includes education, experience and the interaction of between education
and experience. The results show that Hypothesis H.1.a was not supported; education
was not found to significantly affect task performance (F = .14, p = .71). Figure 23
shows least squares means for the model. The least squares means (LSM) are values
predicted by the model given the presence or absence of the treatment. This method
allowed comparing the effect of one dependent variable, while holding other effects
constant and is necessary given the interaction effects indicated in Figure 22. The LSM
plots and tables below indicate which treatment condition is held constant in the labeled x
axis. The LSM can differ from simple means;
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Table 15 shows slight differences in the raw means and the LSMs. Often, the LSM
values can be closer together than the sample means based on the predicted values and
other model factors.

Control

Treatment

Figure 23: Education Treatment Performance LSM Plot

Table 15: Education Treatment Performance LSM Values
Level
No Education Treatment
Education Treatment

Least Sq
Mean
14.75
14.06

Std
Error
1.30
1.33

Raw
Mean
14.98
14.12

Hypothesis H.1.b was supported; experience was found to significantly affect task
performance (F = 12.76, p < .001). The pronounced difference between those who did
not receive the experience treatment and those who did seems to be the result of
correcting larger numbers of errors by some individuals. Figure 24 shows the leverage
plots of the responses’ residuals on a chart. This is an analysis that compares the
residuals of the treatments while holding other treatments constant. The left hand
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contains the relative scores for those who did not receive the experience treatment (the
control group and the education only group). The right hand show those who received
the experience treatment (experience only group or education and experience group).
One can clearly see that the side that received the experience treatment does not contain
participants with very high scores. The p-value provided in the x axis indicates that
individuals who received the experience treatment, either by itself or accompanied with
education, performed significantly better than the control group, p<.01.

Control

Treatment

Figure 24: Experience Treatment Effect and Responses

Figure 25 shows the LSM effect of experience; when the LSM from education effect
and LSM from experience are compared, one can see that experience has a much greater
impact upon performance. This finding is confirmed by the complete model analysis,
shown in Table 16.
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Control

Treatment

Figure 25: Experience Treatment Performance LSM Plot

Table 16: Treatment Effects upon Performance
Source

Nparm

DF

Education
Experience
Education*Experience

1
1
1

1
1
1

Sum of
Squares
12.10
1101.83
21.13

Baseline Residuals

1

1

2746.96

F Ratio

Prob > F

0.14
12.76
0.24

0.71
<0.001
0.62

31.81

<.0001

Model 2: H.2.a and H.2.b
2:
Equation 3: Model 2 for H.2.a, H.2.b, and H.2.c

Model 2 employs the above equation to test the influence of education and experience
on a participant’s perceived task-load. Hypotheses H.2.a and H.2.b were not supported.
Education alone was not found to significantly affect perceived task-load (F = .90, p =
.346). Figure 26 shows that those in the education alone and experience alone group
111

actually indicated slightly lower perceived task-loads (although the differences are still
within the margin of error). Likewise, experience alone was not found to significantly
affect perceived task-load (F = .89, p = .347). However, there was a significant
interaction effect between education and experience (F = 5.27, p = .024). This finding
supports H.2.c. Figure 26 shows that participants in the education and experience
treatment group indicated much higher task-loads than those in other groups, see
Table 17.

Figure 26: NASA-TLX Group Means with Standard Error Bars
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Control

Treatment

Figure 27: NASA-TLX Interaction Effect

Table 17: NASA-TLX Interaction Effect Values
Source

Nparm

DF

Education
Experience
Education*Experience

1.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00

Sum of
Squares
206.48
205.03
1212.11

F Ratio

Prob > F

0.90
0.89
5.27

0.35
0.35
0.02

Model 3: H.3.a and H.3.b
3:
Equation 4: Model 3 for H.3.a H.3.b, and H.3.c

Model 3 test the influence of education and experience upon the contextual
performance measure of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Education was
found to significantly affect organizational citizenship behavior (F = 4.42, p = .038).
Therefore hypothesis H.3.a was supported. Figure 28 shows the raw scores and one can
see that those who received the education treatment, either education alone or as part of
the education and experience score higher. Figure 29 shows graphically that those who
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received the education treatment scored significantly higher than those who did not
receive the education treatment.
Table 18 provides the interaction results and confirms that education significantly
affected the participants’ OCB scores. Hypothesis H.3.b was not supported; experience
was not found to significantly affect OCB (F = 12.76, p = .001), as can be seen in Figure
30. Likewise, H.3.c was not supported because no interaction effect of education and
experience upon OCB was observed (F = .03, p = .85), see
Table 18.

Figure 28: OCB Group Means with Standard Error Bars

Table 18: OCB Interaction Effect Values
Source

Nparm

DF

Education
Experience
Education*Experience

1.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
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Sum of
Squares
811.35
6.83
6.36

F Ratio

Prob > F

4.42
0.04
0.03

0.04
0.85
0.85

Control

Treatment

Figure 29: Education Treatment OCB LSM Plot

Control

Treatment

Figure 30: Experience Treatment OCB LSM Plot
Model 4: H.1.d
:

Equation 5: Model 4 for H.1.d
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Models 4, 5, and 6 all used the same subject characteristics to test their influence
upon performance, perceived task-load and OCB respectively. The subject
characteristics employed were selected based upon their theoretical relationship to the
research model. The models use previous supply experience, previous supply experience,
and the individual dimensions of the Big-Five personality assessment: extraversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness (John and Srivastava, 1999).
Model 4 was formulated to test the influence subject characteristics upon performance.
Hypothesis H.1.d was not supported; measured subject characteristics were not found to
significantly affect task performance (F =.77, p = .688), see
Table 19 and Table 20.

Table 19: Effect of Subject Characteristics upon Performance
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

13.00
86.00
99.00

Sum of
Squares
1263.12
10836.21
12099.33

Mean
Square
97.16
126.00

F Ratio

Prob > F

0.77

0.69

Table 20: Effect of Subject Characteristics upon Performance Values
Source

Nparm

DF

Baseline Residuals
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Neuroticism
Openness

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
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Sum of
Squares
2278.29
44.42
0.94
1.24
71.44
0.02

F Ratio

Prob > F

22.63
0.44
0.01
0.01
0.71
0.00

<.0001
0.51
0.92
0.91
0.40
0.99

Previous Supply Exp
Previous Supply Edu

5.00
3.00

5.00
3.00

383.43
106.01

0.76
0.35

0.58
0.79

Model 5: H.2.d
5:

Equation 6: Model 5 for H.2.d

Model 5 was formulated to assess the influence of subject characteristics upon
perceived task-load. Hypothesis H.2.d was not supported; measured subject
characteristics were not found to significantly affect perceived task-load (F =.96, p =
.501), see Table 21 and Table 22.

Table 21: Effect of Subject Characteristics upon Perceived Task-load Index
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

13.00
86.00
99.00

Sum of
Squares
2984.68
20663.59
23648.27

Mean
Square
229.59
240.27

F Ratio
0.96

Prob >
F
0.50

Table 22: Effect of Subject Characteristics upon Perceived Task-load Values
Source

Nparm

DF

Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Neuroticism
Openness

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
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Sum of
Squares
56.17
313.96
135.81
33.84
265.09

F Ratio

Prob > F

0.23
1.31
0.57
0.14
1.10

0.63
0.26
0.45
0.71
0.30

Previous Supply Exp
Previous Supply Edu

5.00
3.00

5.00
3.00

2016.10
22.75

1.68
0.03

0.15
0.99

Model 6: H.3.d
6:

Equation 7: Model 6 for H.3.d

The final model was designed to assess the influence of subject characteristics upon
the contextual performance measure of OCB. Hypothesis H.3.d was supported; some
measured subject characteristics were found to significantly affect OCB (F =4.74, p =
.000), see and
Table 23. Both extroversion and supply experience were found to significantly
increase individuals’ OCB, see
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Table 24. Further analysis of the supply experience variable shows the strong linear
relationship between increased experience and increased OCB scores, see Figure 31. The
finding indicates that as supply workers acquire more experience, their levels of
contextual performance improve.

Figure 31: Previous Supply Experience Levels and OCB Scores

Table 23: Effect of Subject Characteristics upon OCB
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

13.00
86.00
99.00

Sum of
Squares
7695.71
10754.45
18450.16
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Mean
Square
591.98
125.05

F Ratio

Prob > F

4.73

<.0001
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Table 24: Effect of Subject Characteristics upon OCB Values
Source

Nparm

DF

Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Neuroticism
Openess
Previous Supply Exp
Previous Supply Edu

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
5.00
3.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
5.00
3.00

Sum of
Squares
1881.82
21.68
419.98
9.25
413.30
1632.10
229.12

F Ratio

Prob > F

15.05
0.17
3.36
0.07
3.31
2.61
0.61

<0.00
0.68
0.07
0.79
0.07
0.03
0.61

Post-hoc Analyses
Some participants completed all line items, but made some errors. Conversely, some
participants made no errors, but ran out of time before completing the task. However, no
participants were able to complete all lines and commit no errors. This was taken as
verification that the difficulty of the task was appropriate. Moreover, all lines were
successfully picked by some participants…except one. One of the line items included
two individually packaged surgical gloves that came in boxes with a quantity of ten per
box; the bin location contained four boxes of gloves. The pick list identified the unit of
issue as “1 each”, a unit instead of a box. All participants picked two boxes instead of
opening the box and selecting two packaged gloves. Had the boxes been full, the
customer would have received 20 gloves instead of two. This scenario is a realistic
occurrence in Air Force warehouses. During a tour of an Air Force warehouse, this
researcher noticed some boxes had yellow stickers with permanent marker writings such
as “8 left in box.” Could such a prompt remedy the surgical glove picking error?
After the planned trials were completed, two additional volunteers arrived expecting
to participate. This research used the opportunity to modify the mock supply area by
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adding sticky notes to the end of each box with the current number of glove packages
inside. The two additional participants successfully opened the boxes and picked two
gloves instead of two boxes. While this ad-hoc assessment included only two
participants, it certainly warrants further investigation.
There appears to be trade-off decision made by the participants between speed and
accuracy. Previous research had identified changes in performance when a deadline was
varied (Grasha and Schell, 2001). However, this research discovered that the individuals
were making the decision to work faster and less accurate or slower and more accurate
with the same time parameter (15 minutes). Figure 32 shows the results of Table 25
graphically. The results show a significant (F = 53.70, p = <.001) relationship between
working faster and committing more errors.

Figure 32: Speed and Errors
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Table 25: Speed and Error Values
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

1.00
98.00
99.00

Sum of
Squares
532.08
970.96
1503.04

Mean
Square
532.08
9.91

F Ratio

Prob > F

53.70

<.0001

Additionally, those in the experience group were slower on average, as can be seen in
Figure 33. The chart shows the number of lines not completed for the picking task. While
the differences seem stark, the groups are not significantly different due to the large
within-group variance of lines completed. The large variances can easily be seen in
Figure 34. The fanning out of the scores is indicative of unequal variance. However,
when separated into block and analyzed for unequal variances, the unequal variances are
not significant, as can be seen in Table 26. Although the variances are not significant at
the .05 level, they are close. This is representative of a design that bottoms out at zero,
but allows for a virtually infinite number of errors. Some individuals from each group
completed all lines, but the means show that more total lines were completed by those in
the control group; that is, they were moving faster and making more errors than the
groups that received the education and experience treatments.

Table 26: Speed and Errors Test of Unequal Variance
Test

F Ratio DFNum DFDen

Prob > F

O'Brien[.5]

2.54

2.00

97.00

0.08

Brown-Forsythe

2.83

2.00

97.00

0.06
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Figure 33: Lines Not Completed by Group

Figure 34: Variance of Lines Not Completed by Group
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V. Discussion
The research model included 12 connections of mission clarity to job performance as
shown in Figure 35. This research has helped identify which elements of mission clarity
provide the strongest relationship to job performance. Experience was the most
influential determinant of task performance. The interaction of education and experience
was the most influential factor of perceived task-load. Both education and subject
characteristics influenced contextual performance. The results of all the hypotheses are
summarized in

Table 27.

Figure 35: Research Model
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Table 27: Summary of Hypotheses

H.1.a
H.1.b
H.1.c
H.1.d
H.2.a
H.2.b
H.2.c
H.2.d
H.3.a
H.3.b
H.3.c
H.3.d

Independent Variable
Education
Experience
Education*Experience
Subject Characteristics
Education
Experience
Education*Experience
Subject Characteristics
Education
Experience
Education*Experience
Subject Characteristics

Dependent Variable
Task performance
Task performance
Task performance
Task performance
Task‐load
Task‐load
Task‐load
Task‐load
OCB
OCB
OCB
OCB

Hypotheses
Positive relationship
Positive relationship
Positive relationship
Positive relationship
Significant relationship
Significant relationship
Significant relationship
Significant relationship
Significant relationship
Significant relationship
Significant relationship
Significant relationship

Outcome
Not supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Not supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported

Theoretical Implications
This research included education as a component of mission clarity. The results
showed that education administered via traditional learning methods has limited effects
upon changing performance. This finding supports the learning literature that identifies
experience as a necessary component to produce enduring changes in behavior, learning
(Crick et al., 2013; Olson, 2015). The experience component provided more context to
the workers’ task. Increased mission clarity was shown to improve performance. Based
on organizational learning literature, we expect the learning to diffuse throughout the
organization (Argote, 2013). Given that experience impacts performance, then future
models of mission clarity should retain experience as a key element. Subject
characteristics may need to be included as control variables rather than modeled as
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predictors of performance. Finally, the type and quality of education varies greatly from
organization to organization. Education may need to be refined to fit the organization of
interest. For example, if an organization uses only on-the-job training to educate
employees, it should be operationalized differently than for organizations that rely on
computer-based training. Matching the type of education to actual settings will ensure
that any findings will provide meaningful conclusions.
This research buttressed human error literature regarding the types of errors workers
can make. Although there are competing models of human error (Rasmussen, 1983), the
generic error modeling system (GEMS) proved well-fitted for this research. Supply
workers frequently face errors that can be classified as skill-based, rule-based, and
knowledge-based. The participants in this study committed skill-based errors by
miscounting items, dropping items, and skipping line items. They committed rule-based
mistakes by failing to follow unit of issue guidance on the picking lists, incorrectly
picking based on provided notes, and mislabeling orders. Finally, the opportunities for
knowledge-based mistakes were not as abundant, but provided the greatest opportunity
for severe errors (Reason, 2000). Participants were faced with potential knowledgebased errors when completing tasks differently than standard Air Force procedures. For
example, due to logistical timing, the experiment guided participants to complete all three
shipping labels before picking all three orders. In an operational Air Force warehouse,
the normal procedure is to complete one order at a time and print the shipping label after
picking all the needed items. However, some commercial facilities will have pickers
working on more than one order at time. One facility we toured was designed for pickers
to fill four orders at one time. When faced with novel problems, which exhausted their
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normal operating rules, the workers would ask for guidance or guess about what they
should do. Although, participants were repeatedly told they could ask questions
throughout, many did not. To reduce the number of knowledge-based mistakes, workers
should be empowered to seek additional information as needed in novel situations
(Hopkins, 2012).
This study provided support for theoretical causes of inventory record inaccuracy
(IRI). One of the contributors to IRI is the warehouse worker via misplacement (Kang
and Gershwin, 2005; Rekik, Sahin, Jemai, et al., 2008). During the experimental tasks,
the participants contributed to IRI with a variety of actions. Some participants would
bring the order box (plastic tub) to the supply rack. Others would leave the tub on the
table and walk back and forth with the items. Moreover, some would grab an excess of
items, count them on the walk to the tub and return the excess to the storage rack. Some
of the items were stored in smaller containers that were easily carried back and forth.
However, sometimes, when returning the item to the storage rack, the participants would
put them in the wrong location.
We also found evidence of satisficing. Participants were instructed to verify notes
relating to the items. Participants displayed varied levels of thoroughness to achieve a
satisfactory outcome. When individuals deem a choice as valid before ensuring the
accuracy of that choice to the appropriate level, they are satisficing (Schwartz et al.,
2002). The research revealed three main plateaus of item verification. For example,
consider the information shown in the line item for an auto-suture device, see Table 28.
The pickers should have proceeded to bin “R1C” and picked seven 45-4.8 auto-suture
devices and ensured all packages were still sealed. Some participants would do this as
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expected and correctly pick the items. Other participants would display satisficing by
proceeding to the bin and assume integrity of the bins, not accounting for IRI. They
would pick seven packages and not read the nomenclature or notes. In this particular bin,
there was also a 45-2.5 auto-suture package. The package was roughly the same size and
the device looked similar; although they were labeled differently and trimmed with
different colors, see Figure 36. Lastly, some participants displayed an intermediary level
of satisficing. They would proceed to the correct bin and verify the nomenclature and
notes of the first item picked. Having received sufficient information to be comfortable
with their decision (Caplin et al., 2011; Shi et al., 2011), they displayed satisficing by
assuming the other items must also be accurate.

Table 28: Auto-Suture Line Item Example
NSN

Location

Qty

Nomenclature

Unit of Issue, Notes

5762‐34‐757‐7178

R1C

7

45‐4.8 AUTOSUTURE

1 EA, SEALED

Figure 36: Example of Visual Differences of Auto-Sutures
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The research failed to reject the null hypothesis that subject characteristics affect task
performance. This result seems to indicate that previous Air Force supply experience did
not either help or hinder participants in the simulated task. This is understandable, given
that the task was designed to be accessible for all participants regardless of experience
level. The task was designed as an amalgamation of supply practices and did not
conform to only Air Force operating procedures. For example, the participants used a
generic pick list, see Appendix F, instead of the organization’s actual forms, see
Appendices G and H. Consequently, the lack of subject characteristics interacting with
the performance measure increases the external validity of the study. Since subject
characteristics did not significantly relate to performance, the generic tasks in the
experiment could have been completed by non-supply participants.
Application to Operational Settings
This research was conducted in a controlled field setting, with operationally related
elements. Therefore, the results should be externally valid to operational pick and pack
operations. The practical recommendations discovered in the process of this research can
apply to the Air Force as well as other organizations with pick and pack operations.
This research has added support and fidelity to the basic concept that worker behavior
affects firm performance (Bruccoleri et al., 2014), see Figure 37. Increasing workers’
mission clarity can be accomplished via numerous avenues, depending on the
organization. An example of how an organization should increase their workers’ mission
clarity was discovered during the course of this research. An Air Force supply officer
had initiated a base-level exchange program. The operational supply squadron began
providing young supply airmen assigned to staff positions 6-months of warehouse
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experience. Airmen in the staff positions work in an office setting and could potentially
serve for years without ever actually working in a warehouse. This exchange program is
an inexpensive solution that provides the Airmen greater context of their customers, thus
increasing their mission clarity. Another example of how an organization should increase
mission clarity was discovered at the conclusion of this research. A few months prior,
this researcher spoke with a warehouse manager for a large retailer about mission clarity
and how it should improve pick and pack performance. Afterwards, he decided to
provide his pick and pack employees a distribution center tour after 90-days of
employment. Such a activities should increase the employee’s mission clarity. Finally, it
appears that the work station design could greatly reduce the total error rate. Basic
improvements to the process should include removing all identifiers including the letter O
and number 0 along with uppercase “I”, lowercase “l”, or the number 1, which were
confused during the picking process.

Worker
Errors

Firm
Performance

Job
Performance

Supply Chain
Performance

Figure 37: Conceptual Model

Organizations often desire to improve worker performance, yet improvements must
be balanced with limited resources. For example, if the organization seeks to reduce the
shipping error rate, they have a few options. One is to institute more checklists.
Checklists can be useful for reducing skill-based errors, but increase the time needed to
complete an action, thus increasing costs (Reason, 2002). Furthermore, there is a startup
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cost for developing and maintaining the checklists. Other checks could be instituted such
as second and third quality control reviewers. Such additions will find more errors, but
also introduce potential sources of other errors, plus they rapidly increase the required
manpower needed for each shipment. Another option is to invest in more augmented
verifications. There is much research on technologies that can increase order accuracy
(Berger and Ludwig, 2007; Hardgrave et al., 2013; Rekik, Sahin and Dallery, 2008),
however they have significant startup cost. Organizations, including the Air Force, must
consider what options will provide the greatest return on investment; in this case,
reducing the most errors with the least disruptive and expensive option. From the
research presented here, increasing worker mission clarity should provide the needed
balance. Programs such as the supply exchange program referenced above are relatively
inexpensive, readily carried out, and are sensible to managers.
Limitations and Call for Future Research
The target population for this research was Air Force supply workers. However, the
use of active duty Air Force enlisted personnel potentially reduces the external validity to
other organizations. For example, this research has shown that as supply workers acquire
more experience, their level of contextual performance improves. This finding may be
confounded by the correlation of supply experience to years in the Air Force. It is
reasonable to expect that personnel with longer tenure in an organization would have
higher levels of contextual performance. Future studies should include both supply
experience and tenure with the current organization to see which variable is increasing
the workers’ contextual performance. However, given that the research focused on
human behavior, it is reasonable to expect similar performance in similar settings. The
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vice-president of Wal-Mart Logistic Services, who also had a successful career
culminating as a Rear-Admiral in the U.S. Navy said, “When you get to the people
aspect, you’ll find there’s not a whole lot of difference between industry and the military:
people are people” (McCollum, 2016).
Some of the results included wide variances. Much of this variance could be reduced
through two main approaches. The first is to increase the replications and refining the
experimental procedure iteratively. The second is to reduce the phenomenon assessed in
one study. For example, this experiment had participants complete both the physical task
and make the shipping labels. Future research could isolate the various aspects to refine
the impact of mission clarity upon the SC components. Replications could also refine the
assessment of mission knowledge. The mission knowledge measurement was the only
item with a Cronbach alpha below .7; it was .65. Ideally, a higher score would be
preferred. Even though the lower value is not uncommon in first measurements
associated with intelligence measures (Loewenthal, 2001b), future studies could increase
internal reliability by refining the questions and increasing clarity. The assessment used
in this research allowed some of the questions to be open ended; I recommend future
assessments increase the number of questions and make them all multiple-choice. This
change will eliminate the need to grade participants’ responses and should increase
internal reliability.
Additionally, this research did not measure the lasting impact of organizational
learning and mission clarity. Future studies could improve a portion of the organization’s
mission clarity and assess the diffusion of information throughout the organization.
Idyllically, a study could find a large organization with multiple pick and pack locations.
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The researchers could actively increase the mission clarity of workers at some sites while
measuring others as a control. The results of this research indicate that the sites with
greater mission clarity should perform better. If the above study is conducted, research
based on the diffusion of learning could be applied to the organization to assess how
many workers and to what extent organizations should increase mission clarity. It would
beneficial for an organization to know what benefits are gained from various levels of
mission clarity saturation.
To reflect realistic warehouses and based on empirical findings, this research included
about 5% stocking errors. The majority of errors occurred with these line items.
Therefore, future research should address how organizations can effectively reduce
inventory record inaccuracies. As more organizations become dependent upon complex
stocking processes, record inaccuracies will affect warehouse management differently
than in the past. When a warehouse is relatively open, visible inspections of racks is
possible, even if tedious. However, when inventory is stocked and retrieved
automatically, visually locating missing inventory can be virtually impossible.
Finally, given the exploratory relationship of mission clarity to performance, this
researcher recommends future studies continue to refine the elements that comprise
mission clarity and its affect upon performance. One option is to conduct a detailed task
analysis to assess the human factors associated with each facet of the pick and pack
procedure. The task analysis would organizationally dependent, but would provide
insight to similar operations. As the impact of mission clarity is replicated, the benefits
will help organizations quantify the benefit-to-cost ratios and determine the best methods
to reduce errors in picking and packing operations.
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Appendix A—Big Five Inventory
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Appendix B—Education Treatment Narrative and Slide
“This experiment is based on supplies needed for medical evacuation (medivac)
missions facilitated by the Red Cross and local charities. The items here are a sampling
of the many items that are considered surplus by the Air Force. The surplus items are
transferred to the Red Cross for active medivac missions every 6 months. It is important
for the orders to be filled exactly as requested, because a shortage can mean life-saving
items are not available when or where they are needed. Sending the wrong items or
excess items is unnecessary weight on the critical flights, potentially limiting the other
resources or lives that can be flown out of hostile environments. The orders you fill
today are all going to locations in the Horn of Africa area to help with field hospital
construction and medical evacuations.”

Medivac Supplies
• Air Force surplus items
– Sent every 6 months
– Red Cross and Humanitarian
organizations

• Accuracy is Important
– Lives saved
– Added weight

• Horn of Africa
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Appendix C—Assessment Sheet (Front and Back)
Questions during instructions
Label Start
Typos
Label End
Items Dropped
? during tasks

Baseline

‐‐>
Left on Redo

Arrival Time (wait)
Only one item per line
Talker
Left more messy

Location
L3B
L5D
R6C
R5B
R5C
R3A
R3B
R3F
R3H
R3E
R3K
R3I
R3L
R2D
R3J
R5D

Skipped

Note fail

+/‐

Qty
7
2
2
4
5
7
8
11
3
11
7
5
6
13
5
3

Label 1 Start

1 End

2 End

3 End

Left
on

ln
11
13
15
10
12
6
9
8
7
16
14
5
4
3
2
1

Notes
1 EA, PLASTIC WRAP NEEDED
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA, CLEAR
1 EA, ANY COLOR
1 EA
1 EA

Order 1
Only one item per line

Added Items to order

RED CROSS
AWAWA
1650

Items Dropped
? during tasks
Time Remaining
Lines not completed
Other
Total Order Errors
Notes fail

7AZD2345X1B
ETHIOPIA
1231

Nomenclature
4X7 IN CAM DRESSING FIRST AID
PI INDICATOR UNDERGLOVE
36 IN A.T.S. TOURNIQUET SYS
MEDIUM BINDER CLIP
SMALL BINDER CLIP
LARGE RUBBER BAND
THIN RUBBER BAND
CARD HOLDER
MEDIUM SAFETY PIN
PAPER CLIP
METAL THUMB TACK
BRASS BRAD
PLASTIC THUMB TACK
NON‐STERILE COTTON BUD
T‐TACK
LARGE BINDER CLIP

Redo
Typos

Skipped

Added Items to order
Cups to tubs

RED CROSS
AWAWA
1203

Time Remaining
Lines not completed
Other
Total Order Errors

Location

Participant ID

+/‐

Qty

7ASD2345X1Y
ETHIOPIA
1231

ln Nomenclature

Notes

L1F
R1C
L6A
R5A

3
7
2
3

1
3
5
8

MARK 1 KIT
45‐4.8 AUTOSUTURE
SURGICAL HAND SCRUB
SELF STICK WRAP

2 PC & CASE, NEEDS INSTRUCTIONS
SEALED green right
1 EA
1 ROLL

R2F
L1B
L1E
L1Aa
L5A
R5D
L6C
L1C
R2A
R5C
R3G
R3K

3
5
4
5
4
13
2
3
5
12
3
14

11
2
15
14
13
10
16
6
7
12
9
4

40X40X56 NON‐STERILE BANDAGE
2 IN ADHESIVE BANDAGE
ATA TRAINING KIT
3IN ADHESIVE BANDAGE
HI‐LINE XS DISP CRANIOTOME
LARGE BINDER CLIP
PSI‐TEC TUBING
LARGE ADHESIVE BANDAGE
STERILE ADHESIVE BANDAGE
SMALL BINDER CLIP
LARGE SAFETY PIN
METAL THUMB TACK

INCLUDES TWO SAFETY PINS
1 EA
NEEDS INSTRUCTIONS
1 EA
GE620SU, short, left, one GE432
1 EA
PT4254
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
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Order 2

Participant ID

Items Dropped
? during tasks
Time Remaining
Lines not completed
Other
Total Order Errors
Location
L3B
R6B
L2A
R6A
L5C
R4B
R6C
R2E
L6B
L5B
L1D
R2B
R3F
R3L
R3E
R3J

Skipped

Notes fail

Only one item per line
WORLD HEALTH ORG
PALS
5220
+/‐

Qty
11
3
2
2
2
3
9
3
2
3
2
3
15
11
13
7

ln
1
2
6
8
11
9
12
13
15
16
10
7
3
4
14
5

Nomenclature
4X7 IN CAM DRESSING FIRST AID
HEMORRAGE CONTROL DRESSING
White box
ANTHREX ACP KIT SERIES I
VIAL DECANTER
ULTRASOUND TRANSMISSION GEL
36 IN A.T.S. TOURNIQUET SYS
4.5 IN X 4.1 YD STERILE ROLL
OXYGEN HIGH FLOW SAMPLER
HI‐LINE XS DISP TWIST DRILL
NON‐ADHERENT PAD
LARGE KNUCKLE BANDAGE
CARD HOLDER
PLASTIC THUMB TACK
PAPER CLIP
T‐TACK

Order 3

Only one item per line

Items Dropped
? during tasks
Time Remaining
Lines not completed
Other
Total Order Errors
Location
L5D
L4A
R4A
R1B
L7B
L1Ab
L3A
R2C
R3A
R3B
R5B
R3C
R3D
R3I
R3H
R2D

NASA Start
NASA End*

Skipped

Notes fail

HUMANITARIAN INTL
GIOHER
2550

+/‐

Added Items to order
7ASD3274Y2X
SOMALIA
5706
Notes
PLASTIC WRAP NEEDED
RESEALED OKAY
11X35 MM BIOCOMP INT SCREW
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
VACUUM SEALED
SN: 112‐138 & 112‐137
GE432SU longer, right all 432s
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA, CLEAR
1 EA
1 EA

Added Items to order
7ASE7234Y3X
SOMALIA
5706

Qty
6
2
4
5
2
5

ln
4
2
7
9
13
5

Nomenclature
PI INDICATOR UNDERGLOVE
4.7X3 MM CURVED CUTTER
SAM SPLINT
45‐2.5 AUTOSUTURE
DUAL HOSE STER 36 IN
2.5 IN ADHESIVE BANDAGE

Notes
1 EA
1 EA
36 IN
SEALED red left
1 EA
1 EA

5
3
7
7
11
3
4
6
7
23

15
10
6
12
8
11
14
3
16
1

20X15 MM TUNGSTEN LOOP ELECT
8 PLY 2X2 IN GAUZE SPONGE
LARGE RUBBER BAND
THIN RUBBER BAND
MEDIUM BINDER CLIP
ADHESIVE FABRIC PIN
STAR PAPER CLIP
BRASS BRAD
MEDIUM SAFETY PIN
NON‐STERILE COTTON BUD

1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
ANY COLOR, 1 EA

FTLC
‐‐NOTES‐‐

Questions during NASA TLX
Questions during Survey
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Appendix E—Baseline Pick List
ORDER NUMBER
7AZD2345X1B
NSN

1205‐27‐438‐1178
1541‐47‐815‐2063
1694‐41‐652‐9174
2654‐85‐928‐7506
3038‐67‐287‐5923
3567‐71‐061‐5453
3955‐93‐306‐3652
4237‐20‐473‐5558
5828‐84‐560‐8603
6510‐04‐631‐1859
6539‐41‐013‐7506
8816‐40‐967‐6082
8856‐37‐578‐1348
9203‐58‐022‐2819
9412‐88‐589‐8615
9541‐47‐815‐4065

City Country
Code Code
1203
1231

RECIPIENT

City Name, Country Name

RED CROSS

AWAWA, ETHIOPIA

Location

Qty

Nomenclature

Unit of Issue, Notes

R3E
R6C
R3K
L5D
R5C
L3B
R5B
R3B
R3F
R3H
R3A
R3I
R3L
R2D
R3J
R5D

11
2
7
2
5
7
4
8
11
3
7
5
6
13
5
3

PAPER CLIP
36 IN A.T.S. TOURNIQUET SYS
METAL THUMB TACK
PI INDICATOR UNDERGLOVE
SMALL BINDER CLIP
4X7 IN CAM DRESSING FIRST AID
MEDIUM BINDER CLIP
THIN RUBBER BAND
CARD HOLDER
MEDIUM SAFETY PIN
LARGE RUBBER BAND
BRASS BRAD
PLASTIC THUMB TACK
NON‐STERILE COTTON BUD
T‐TACK
LARGE BINDER CLIP

1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA, PLASTIC WRAP NEEDED
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA, CLEAR
1 EA, ANY COLOR
1 EA
1 EA
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Appendix F—Task Pick List
ORDER NUMBER
7ASD2345X1Y
NSN
6839‐85‐859‐8883
6910‐01‐469‐0457
2953‐71‐360‐4490
3994‐60‐555‐4177
3038‐67‐287‐5923
3058‐03‐790‐7203
9541‐47‐815‐4065
1261‐54‐778‐9384
7419‐97‐369‐8271
2100‐03‐176‐8486
2517‐69‐421‐4678
2184‐99‐052‐2396
1694‐41‐652‐9174
5762‐34‐757‐7178
6292‐49‐323‐6762
6910‐01‐194‐0377
ORDER NUMBER
7ASD3274Y2X
NSN
4968‐40‐931‐5327
2863‐13‐115‐8017
1205‐27‐438‐1178
6510‐01‐503‐2117
1541‐47‐815‐2063
5548‐87‐357‐4270
5601‐06‐356‐2460
1321‐77‐665‐1420
6955‐93‐306‐3657
1772‐33‐745‐8904
9616‐95‐841‐3802
9412‐88‐589‐8615
8856‐37‐578‐1348
5828‐84‐560‐8603
6510‐01‐492‐2275
3567‐71‐061‐5453
ORDER NUMBER
7ASE7234Y3X
NSN
6510‐04‐631‐1859
1088‐45‐240‐0183
4436‐90‐794‐0895
3868‐47‐166‐6700
4237‐20‐473‐5558
4645‐27‐149‐2292
8880‐93‐810‐4435
3991‐91‐864‐6552
3955‐93‐306‐3652
4889‐21‐236‐4958
6539‐41‐013‐7506
1839‐85‐859‐8803
2654‐85‐928‐7506
8816‐40‐967‐6082
4201‐16‐299‐8628
9203‐58‐022‐2819

City Code Country Code
RECIPIENT
1650
1231
RED CROSS
Location
Qty
Nomenclature
L6C
2
PSI‐TEC TUBING
L1E
4
ATA TRAINING KIT
L1Aa
5
3IN ADHESIVE BANDAGE
L5A
4
HI‐LINE XS DISP CRANIOTOME
R5C
12
SMALL BINDER CLIP
R2F
3
40X40X56 NON‐STERILE BANDAGE
R5D
13
LARGE BINDER CLIP
R3G
3
LARGE SAFETY PIN
R5A
3
SELF STICK WRAP
R2A
5
STERILE ADHESIVE BANDAGE
L1C
3
LARGE ADHESIVE BANDAGE
L6A
2
SURGICAL HAND SCRUB
R3K
14
METAL THUMB TACK
R1C
7
45‐4.8 AUTOSUTURE
L1B
5
2 IN ADHESIVE BANDAGE
L1F
3
MARK 1 KIT
City Code Country Code
RECIPIENT
5220
5706
WORLD HEALTH ORG
Location
Qty
Nomenclature
L5B
3
HI‐LINE XS DISP TWIST DRILL
L6B
2
OXYGEN HIGH FLOW SAMPLER
R3E
13
PAPER CLIP
R2E
3
4.5 IN X 4.1 YD STERILE ROLL
R6C
9
36 IN A.T.S. TOURNIQUET SYS
L5C
2
VIAL DECANTER
L1D
2
NON‐ADHERENT PAD
R4B
3
ULTRASOUND TRANSMISSION GEL
R6A
2
ANTHREX ACP KIT SERIES I
R2B
3
LARGE KNUCKLE BANDAGE
L2A
2
11X35 MM BIOCOMP INT SCREW
R3J
7
T‐TACK
R3L
11
PLASTIC THUMB TACK
R3F
15
CARD HOLDER
R6B
3
HEMORRAGE CONTROL DRESSING
L3B
11
4X7 IN CAM DRESSING FIRST AID
City Code Country Code
RECIPIENT
2550
5706
HUMANITARIAN INTL
Location
Qty
Nomenclature
R3H
7
MEDIUM SAFETY PIN
L3A
5
20X15 MM TUNGSTEN LOOP ELECT
R3D
4
STAR PAPER CLIP
L7B
2
DUAL HOSE STER 36 IN
R3B
7
THIN RUBBER BAND
R3C
3
ADHESIVE FABRIC PIN
R2C
3
8 PLY 2X2 IN GAUZE SPONGE
R1B
5
45‐2.5 AUTOSUTURE
R5B
11
MEDIUM BINDER CLIP
R4A
4
SAM SPLINT
R3A
7
LARGE RUBBER BAND
L1Ab
5
2.5 IN ADHESIVE BANDAGE
L5D
6
PI INDICATOR UNDERGLOVE
R3I
6
BRASS BRAD
L4A
2
4.7X3 MM CURVED CUTTER
R2D
23
NON‐STERILE COTTON BUD
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City Name, Country Name
AWAWA, ETHIOPIA
Unit of Issue, Notes
1 EA, PT4254
1 EA, NEEDS INSTRUCTIONS
1 EA
1 EA, GE620SU
1 EA
1 EA, INCLUDES TWO SAFETY PINS
1 EA
1 EA
1 ROLL
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA, SEALED
1 EA
2 PC & CASE, NEEDS INSTRUCTIONS
City Name, Country Name
PALS, SOMALIA
Notes
1 EA, GE432SU
1 EA, SN: 112‐138 & 112‐137
1 EA
1 EA, VACUUM SEALED
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA, CLEAR
1 EA
1 EA, RESEALED OKAY
1 EA, PLASTIC WRAP NEEDED
City Name, Country Name
GIOHER, SOMALIA
Notes
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA, SEALED
1 EA
36 IN
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA
1 EA, ANY COLOR

Appendix G: DD Form 1348
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Appendix H: Sample of a DA Form 2765-1 as a Request for Issue
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Once or twice

Never

How often have you done each of the following
things on your present job?

Once or twice per month

Appendix I: Organizational Citizenship Behavior Inventory

1. Picked up meal for others at work

1 2 3 4 5

2. Took time to advise, coach, or mentor a co-worker.

1 2 3 4 5

3. Helped co-worker learn new skills or shared job knowledge.

1 2 3 4 5

4. Helped new employees get oriented to the job.

1 2 3 4 5

5. Lent a compassionate ear when someone had a work problem.

1 2 3 4 5

6. Lent a compassionate ear when someone had a personal problem.

1 2 3 4 5

7. Changed vacation schedule, work days, or shifts to accommodate coworker’s needs.
8. Offered suggestions to improve how work is done.

1 2 3 4 5

9. Offered suggestions for improving the work environment.

1 2 3 4 5

10. Finished something for co-worker who had to leave early.

1 2 3 4 5

11. Helped a less capable co-worker lift a heavy box or other object.

1 2 3 4 5

12. Helped a co-worker who had too much to do.

1 2 3 4 5

13. Volunteered for extra work assignments.

1 2 3 4 5

14. Took phone messages for absent or busy co-worker.

1 2 3 4 5

15. Said good things about your employer in front of others.

1 2 3 4 5

16. Gave up meal and other breaks to complete work.

1 2 3 4 5

17. Volunteered to help a co-worker deal with a difficult customer, vendor, or
co-worker.
18. Went out of the way to give co-worker encouragement or express
appreciation.
19. Decorated, straightened up, or otherwise beautified common work space.

1 2 3 4 5

20. Defended a co-worker who was being "put-down" or spoken ill of by other
co-workers or supervisor.

1 2 3 4 5
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1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

Appendix J: NASA Task-load Index
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Appendix K: List of Abbreviations
AFB Air Force Base
GEMS Generic Error Modelling System
IRI Inventory Record Inaccuracy
LSM Least Squares Means
NASA-TLX National Air and Space Administration – Task Load Index
OB Organizational Behavior
OCB Organizational Citizenship Behavior
OL Organizational Learning
SCM Supply Chain Management
SCOG Supply Chain Operations Group
SCOW Supply Chain Operations Wing
SRK- Skills, Rules, Knowledge
TPS Toyota Production System
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